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ABSTRACT
New technologies and increased competition require CEOs to assess and analyze vast
amounts of information. They need cognitive ability and higher education and training.
Moreover, CEOs are under more pressure to act quickly, to recognize potential problems
or opportunities, and to take action immediately. They must be willing to take risks (Joos,
Leone, & Zimmerman, 2003). Companies are turning to younger CEOs (Loomis, 2007)
as they are more familiar with new technologies, better able to endure high stress
environments, more open to new ideas, and less reluctant to take risks.
This study examined the relationship between the financial performance of a
company and specific demographic factors of its CEO, including age, tenure, education,
and prior experience, and whether the CEO was hired from within or outside the
company. Also, the study examined the relationship between CEO’s age and tenure
before and after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (1999). The goal was to establish a
prediction model, based on demographics of successful financial industry CEOs, to aid
companies in their selection of new CEOs. The data were collected from U.S. companies
in the insurance, securities, diversified financial, commercial banks, and IT industries
which file financial statements with a government agency.
The findings indicate a significant difference in:
•

a new insurance CEO’s age and tenure before and after the repeal of the GlassSteagall Act (1999)

•

the age of new CEOs of insurance companies and that of their counterparts at
other types of financial institutions or IT companies.

There was no significant difference in the level of education or tenure.

x
There was a significant correlation between:
•

the changes in return on equity and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and
prior experience

•

changes in revenue, in stock price, and in return on equity and the variables of
firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure

•

changes in stock price and a new CEO who graduated from school tier three or
four (below average undergraduate schools).

There was no significant correlation between a new CEO’s age, school tier, degree, and
prior experiences, and a company’s change in revenue or in its stock price.
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Chapter 1 – Overview
As an owner/manager of an insurance brokerage firm, this researcher is always
curious to learn what happens to companies when CEOs are replaced. Among other
things, do companies experience rapid growth or is there a significant decrease in market
value? The selection or replacement of CEOs not only affects a company’s performance
(Hogan & Kaiser, 2005) but also the national economy (Luhby, 2008) as evidenced by
the recent economic turmoil. Among the many factors that companies must take into
consideration when selecting a CEO is leadership ability and how this can be defined and
verified.
The researcher is a huge believer in management scholar Hogan and Kaiser’s
“personality predicts leadership” (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). Hogan and Kaiser believe that
personality is vital to a leader’s success because effective leadership “involves
persuading other people to set aside, for a period of time, their individual concerns and to
pursue a common goal that is important for the responsibilities and welfare of a group”
(Hogan, Curphy & Hogan, 1994, p. 493). Moreover, Hogan, et al. maintain that a leader’s
personality will dictate his/her leadership style, and therefore eventually impact, if not
determine, organizational performance.
Like Hogan, et al., (1994) Northouse believes that leadership is a process whereby
an individual influences a group of individuals in order to achieve a common goal
(Northouse, 2001). However, he maintains that leadership is a process rather than a trait
or characteristic. It is not linear, but interactive. In other words, leadership is connected
with building cohesive and goal-oriented teams. Therefore, leadership is closely tied to,
and its true merit dependent upon, team performance.
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It is significant to note the difference between these two definitions of leadership
and how they can be applied to the business world. Northouse (2001) defines leadership
in a more general context in which interaction is possible and expected, for example, in
small companies. Hogan and Kaiser (2005), on the other hand, define leadership in a
more limited context, one that is linear and involves much less interaction. This is the
environment in which a CEO must function, one in which their personality or
management style directly impacts employee and company performance. For the
purposes of this dissertation, the focus will be more on Hogan and Kaiser’s theories and
how they apply to the often autonomous role of CEOs in large companies.
When companies hire new CEOs, they must not only consider personality and
leadership qualities, but also other factors such as one’s age. Warren Buffett believes that
age is one of the most important factors a company must consider when choosing
a CEO’s successor (Loomis, 2007). There is a current trend among companies to hire
CEOs who are younger. I believe that this trend is largely due to heightened competition,
the emphasis and importance of information-based technologies and rapid globalization.
In brief, younger CEOs are more likely to better understand the workings of today’s
technology and the concept of what is new today is old tomorrow than CEOs in the past.
Also, they tend to be more creative and to foster creativity in others, which allows them
to more easily adopt a risk-taking attitude.
I also believe that CEOs now require a higher level of education, with a greater
emphasis on math, economics, and data analysis. Like the trend towards youth, the
importance of higher education is partly due to the onslaught of information brought on
by advances in technology. In addition, because of globalization and heightened
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competition, CEOs are required to have more professional training in making quick
decisions based on objective analysis. A company’s survival can easily depend on a CEO
having this ability. According to Keiser, CEO positions are now considered to be
“professionalizations,” which are defined as jobs or professions that entail intellectual
ability and extensive training (Keiser, 2004).
Prior experience is another important factor in the selection of a CEO.
Throughout their careers, have the candidates demonstrated an ability to solve problems
and/or satisfy the market? Have they enhanced or tarnished the image of a company? Do
they have expertise in a specific area, or skills and knowledge that can be applied to a
wide range of business environments?
This dissertation reviews leadership based trait theory to further study the CEO’s
trait and the CEO’s announcement effect to ensure that a company evaluating CEO
candidates will choose the one who is most qualified and capable.
It also evaluates the job performance and effectiveness of CEOs by examining
changes in revenue, stock prices and returns on equity at certain intervals during his/her
tenure. These changes could serve as proxies to determine whether or not a company has
hired the right CEO – the one most able, competent, qualified, and worthy of the job.
The Problem
When a company replaces its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the stock market’s
demand must be fitted with the company’s supply, which in this case is the selection of a
new CEO. That is, the new CEO’s ability (a combination of personality, age, educational
background, and prior experience) as a leader must meet the market’s expectations. Thus,
upon the announcement of a new CEO, subsequent changes in stock price movement
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(stock price volatility) are inevitable. For example, when Boeing (Colias, 2005) named
W. James McNerney Jr. as CEO in June 2005, its share price increased $4.29. In contrast,
when Nokia (Huuhtanen, 2005) appointed Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo as its new CEO in
August 2005, its U.S. shares slipped $0.10.
The seesaw-like movement in stock prices demonstrates that the financial market
does indeed evaluate the incoming CEO’s ability and reputation. Here, ability (Morris &
Maisto, 2005) means a skill that a CEO actually has and for which the CEO needs no
additional training. Furthermore, reputation (Karuna, 2006) is defined as the market’s
perception of the CEO’s ability to ensure the long-term success and survival of his/her
firm.
The market will endeavor to predict the firm’s future direction by analyzing the
incoming CEO’s ability from his prior experiences and his personality, along with other
demographic factors including age and educational background. Moreover, the stock
market’s initial reaction to a newly-announced CEO may be interpreted as a reflection of
the social-self, or how leaders are perceived by others (Judge, Colbert, & Illies, 2004).
That social-self is reflected by the leader’s emergence and his leadership effectiveness
(Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002).Therefore, the new CEO’s perceived ability
affects the future direction of the firm: its value, its management and its stakeholders.
If a CEO’s intellectual ability (intelligence) is related to his personality
(especially competency) and it is assumed that personality predicts leadership (Hogan, et
al., 2004), then the CEO’s general intellectual ability partly depends on innate cognitive
ability, age and level of education. Moreover, due to rapid globalization, intense
competition and internal and external environmental changes (Choo, 2001) such as
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regulations, politics, economy, technology, socio-culture, and ecology, CEOs are now
expected not only to keep up with but also to adapt to these fast-paced environments by
gaining a broader understanding of the domestic and world markets and by being able to
make the right decisions within a short amount of time. As a result, when a company
selects a new CEO there is a tendency to place more importance upon his/her personality,
age, education level, and prior experience.
The insurance industry is a great example to further study the aforementioned
factors because this previously ossified industry was government regulated until 1999.
Since then, the industry has gone through a tremendous transformation, primarily due to
globalization, deregulation (Yeager, Yeager, & Harshman, 2007) and terrorist attacks.
Meanwhile, the IT (information technology), biotech, and high-tech industries remain
domestically and globally competitive.
In a regulated industry (Hadlock, Lee, & Parrino, 2002), it is much easier to select
a new CEO because the entry barriers, including bureaucracy, either prevent or
discourage other companies, foreign or domestic, from entering the market. This is one
reason why less complex, regulated firms (Joos, et al., 2003) tend to hire younger CEOs.
In contrast, as a result of the transition from a regulated to non-regulated industry,
insurance companies are now hiring slightly older CEOs than before, placing more
emphasis on their experience, professional knowledge and history of financial
performance as evidence of their ability to manage more complex, macro environments
(Joos, et al., 2003).
In addition, there are specific industry characteristics which impact the selection
of CEOs. Both macro and micro factors must be considered when selecting CEO
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candidates from either the inside or the outside. Macro factors are generally non-firm
specific, while micro factors are firm-specific (Joos, et al., 2003). More micro factors are
considered under limited competition for regulated companies, such as utility industries,
whereas more macro factors are considered under unlimited competition. In turn, in the
insurance industry after deregulation, more macro factors are considered. The increased
competition within the same industry makes the choice of CEO more of a risk, as more
competition makes decision making more difficult and more vital to a company’s
survival.
Due to President Clinton’s deregulation of the insurance industry in 1999
(Yeager, et al., 2007), CEOs in the industry have awakened from a long slumber.
Previously, they were protected under laws such as the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. These laws had prohibited banks, insurance
companies and security firms from entering each other’s businesses. However, since
deregulation, i.e., the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (Neale & Peterson, 2005), these
industries have become more competitive among themselves. Moreover, security firms
have now entered the banking industry, and visa versa. For example, in 1998 Citigroup
acquired the security firm, Solomon Smith Barney, whereas Citibank acquired Travelers
Insurance the same year. Citibank (Citigroup, 2002) also acquired California Federal
Bank and made it into an insurance brokerage.
As a result, insurance companies are now placing more emphasis on age,
personality, education and intellectual ability in their selection of CEOs in order to
compete with other financial firms (Joos, et al., 2003). This is brought about by an effort
to ensure that CEOs remain competitive with their more experienced and highly trained
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counterparts at banks, such as the Bank of America and Citibank, and at investment
companies, such as Prudential and Merrill Lynch.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between a firm’s
performance and the new incoming CEO’s personality and leadership style, as well as
his/her age, education level, and prior experiences. From this, we should be able to
determine what role these factors play in the success or failure of a company’s financial
performance. The ultimate goal is to arrive at a formula which will enable companies to
select the candidates who are most suitable for the given business sector and who are the
most likely to succeed.
The publicly held business corporation (Horngren, 1981) is an extremely delicate
structure, partly because ownership is shared by stockholders who often delegate
management responsibilities to professionals. This delegation relationship is called an
agency contract (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) in which stockholders engage another person
(agent) to perform some service on their behalf. This act involves delegating some
decision-making authority. To maximize shareholders’ interests, agency costs (the sum of
the costs of formal and informal structuring contracts) should be minimized. The best
agency framework (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is to resolve the conflicts of interest
between stockholders, managers, and bondholders of the firm. Due to this complicated
structure, CEOs, as professional managers or owners (Carey & Ogden, 2000), must
survive not only by fulfilling their contracts with the board committees, but also by
satisfying or surpassing market expectations.
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Before examining these relationships any further, it is essential to define the role
of a CEO and to fully understand his or her responsibilities. The Chief Executive Officer
(Downes & Goodman, 1991) is the person primarily responsible for carrying out the
strategic plans and policies of the organization. In addition, a CEO usually assumes the
title of Chairman of the Board or President of a company. In this capacity, a CEO advises
and informs board members, interfaces between the board and staff, and is expected to
fully cooperate with the board in his/her own performance review. He/she not only
attempts to persuade and control board members, but also acts as a peacemaker by
minimizing conflict. Finally, a CEO must compete with rival companies, most often with
limited resources (including human, material, and financial) and under time, information,
and legal constraints.
Similar to the president of a nation, the CEO’s many responsibilities include
recommending a yearly budget for the board’s approval; managing the organization’s
resources within budget guidelines and according to current laws and regulations;
shaping the firm’s climate; opening/closing a plant; entering a new market; marketing,
selling, and developing new products; laying off employees; hiring high-ranking staff;
and increasing the company’s share value (Vancil, 1987). The CEO must also attempt to
increase the value of the firm in order to satisfy the stakeholders. Throughout his/her
reign, the organization’s mission, programs, products, and services should present a
consistently strong, positive image to relevant stakeholders.
A CEO’s critical mistakes due to negligence or faulty actions from misjudgment
often lead to either financial and/or non-financial disaster, not only for the company but
also for society as a whole, as witnessed in the Enron case (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Of all
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these responsibilities, often the most important is the hiring and positioning of highranking officers because “leadership is about the performance of teams, groups, and
organizations” (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005, p. 169).
In an environment of such major rapid change, the CEO’s role (Hill &
Westlaufer, 1998) must also undergo a corresponding transformation, otherwise, his/her
position of authority may quickly evaporate. On the other hand, a CEO must strike a
delicate balance, since rapid change is not always perceived as desirable. For example,
during Franco Bernabe’s six-year tenure as CEO of ENI, Italy’s large, energy-focused
industrial conglomerate, Bernabe quickly transformed the organization from a debtridden, government-owned, and politically controlled entity into a competitive and
profitable publicly traded corporation focused on energy production (Hill & Westlaufer,
1998).
To accomplish this, Bernabe sold off 200 companies, dismissed hundreds of
managers, and installed radical new business systems and procedures. When his tireless
advocacy for change prompted the Board of Directors to demote him and call for his
ouster, he responded, “A leader cannot take the weighted average of other people’s
opinions and make them his own. A person who has to make important decisions has to
make them alone. You need an inner compass to indicate the way” (Hill & Westlaufer,
1998, p. 86).
The following illustrates how a CEO must approach problems from a variety of
angles and take the appropriate actions by using a variety of decision making processes.
In economics and finance, decision making and judgment are based on rational choice
theory (Mellers, Schwartz, & Cook, 1998), which states that if the CEO fails to be
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rational, then he/she will not be able to survive competitive market forces. The CEO
needs to learn quickly as a decision maker, because if he makes a mistake he will be
eliminated from the game.
Some scholars, such as Gigerenzer, Kahneman, and Hammond (Mellers, et al.,
1998) criticize the assumptions behind the rational choice theory. Gigerenzer argues that
good judgment is not only based entirely on rational choice, but also derives from content
analysis, including any underlying laws, principles, and axioms. In addition, good
judgment should reflect basic principles of survival and adaptation. Likewise, Kahneman
(Mellers, et al., 1998) suggests that logical analyses should be supplemented with
substantive evaluations which assess the quality of decision outcomes. Lastly, Hammond
argues that the integration of both internal consistency of decisions and empirical
accuracy of decisions is rationality. As seen in the arguments against the rational choice
theory, the CEO must be a good decision maker based upon his/her intelligence and prior
experiences.
Successful CEOs have many different decision making processes to choose from
and can judge when to change or abandon them entirely (Carey & Ogden, 2000). Such
flexibility encourages and often results in great ideas and inventions. In most cases, the
quality of a CEO’s education, the areas of expertise and experience in making decisions
enable the CEO to identify and solve problems.
In the real business world, the public lives in ambiguity and a lack of knowledge
about relevant probabilities. According to Fox and Tversky (Mellers, et al., 1998),
feelings of competence are dependent upon clear versus ambiguous knowledge. Numbers
alone cannot help CEOs solve problems. Sometimes algorithms work, whereas other
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times heuristics apply. As formal education involves learning both heuristics and
algorithms, it therefore follows that higher education gives CEOs the ability to base
decisions on a variety of factors and to approach problems from different angles.
In any case, many factors can either help or impede problem solving. One of these
factors is the CEO’s level of motivation or emotional arousal, which is influenced by any
number of factors including age, wealth, and tenure. It is generally understood that
younger CEOs have a greater level of motivation and ambition, whereas age may inhibit
older CEOs who are interested in maintaining the status quo (Mellers, et al., 1998). On
the other hand, age, or experience, is often invaluable when faced with problems that
share some semblance to past experience. This paper will look at age as a factor in the
selection of CEOs and see whether this trend towards younger CEOs, with an emphasis
on innovation, education, etc. is a good one or not.
The new CEO’s personality, age, education and prior experiences are all factors
that significantly impact not only the future direction of the firm, but also the CEO’s job
performance and leadership effectiveness (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005).
Leadership, as Hogan and Kaiser (2005) define it, is the ability to build and
maintain a group that performs well compared to its competition. Moreover, leadership
should be evaluated in terms of the performance of the group over time. The performance
of the company can be checked by studying (Copeland & Weston, 1992) the change of
shares in large stockholders as a signal of a change in the firm’s value. In brief, the
selling of company stock often signals less confidence in the company’s future, whereas
the purchase of company stock is perceived as a good sign and will encourage investors.
By studying the relationship between the company’s performance (effectiveness) and the
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past and present demographic factors of CEOs, such as age, education, prior experience,
tenure, and insider/outsider, a model can be developed to help companies choose the right
CEO.
The model will always be contaminated by unexpected external macro factors that
cannot be controlled. These include the implementation of new government regulations,
the penetration of the market by foreign companies, sudden changes in the price of oil,
and innovations in technology. Well-developed application methods already exist that
can predict leadership potential among middle management. However, these were not
intended, nor have they been adapted or amended, to predict the leadership capacity of
potential CEOs. As an example, Hogan and Kaiser’s Domain Model of Competencies
(Hogan & Kaiser, 2005) identifies four broad domains of managerial competencies:
•

The intrapersonal domain, internalized standards of performance;

•

The interpersonal domain, social skills, role taking and role playing abilities;

•

The business domain, abilities and technical knowledge related to organizational
activity;

•

The leadership domain, influence and team building skills.

Hogan and Kaiser highlighted three points about this domain model: a) it is
developmental; b) there is a hierarchy of increasing trainability; c) and it is
comprehensive. The model can be used to identify potential leaders, but is rarely used in
selecting corporate executives, including CEOs (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005).
Companies often hire outside assessment centers which conduct tests that measure
both cognitive ability and personality by applying structured interviews and simulations
(Hogan et al., 1994). Nonetheless, when companies choose CEOs, they do not utilize
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these services since other factors may be of more immediate importance. These services
do not take into account the political realities surrounding the selection between board
members and other stakeholders.
However, unlike Hogan and Kaiser’s definition of leadership, the fact that an
individual or group of leaders is able to emerge from within the group to direct it should
not be ignored. Moreover, it cannot be denied that personality plays a significant role in
leadership (job performance). Leadership personality impacts leadership style which in
turn affects employee attitude, team functioning, and organizational performance (Hogan
& Kaiser, 2005).
Mueller (Marsh, 1989) writes that the first priority of a 21st century leader is to
develop a core team of highly qualified subordinates who can jointly cope with the
problems and uncertainties they may encounter in the future. To achieve this, Zaleznik
(Marsh, 1989) maintains that mentors of tomorrow’s leaders will have to take risks with
people and bet initially on the perceived talent in younger people as they are better
equipped to adapt to change and the competitive global market.
Personality plays an important role in determining leadership style and it has a
direct bearing on both employee attitudes and on how teams function, thereby impacting
the performance of the organization as a whole. It therefore follows that personality can
be instrumental in predicting leadership effectiveness. However, because a numerical
value cannot be placed on personality, stock price movement (Karuna, 2006) takes on
importance in deciding whether or not the company has hired the right CEO. In other
words, revenues as well as stock price changes reflect the CEO’s job performance over
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time which, in turn, reflects leadership. Therefore, personality studies and trait theories
need to be further analyzed.
Problem Statement and Research Hypotheses
It is becoming increasingly difficult for companies to survive in such a highly
competitive world. Accordingly, employers are placing more emphasis on candidates
having graduated from a prominent or well-known university, as this is indicative of their
having received a quality education. Moreover, board members often retain strong alumni
relations, and this often influences their selection of CEOs (Keiser, 2004). This is
especially true in bureaucratic countries such as France, England, Japan, and Korea. To
the mature staging industry, these factors seem to be more applicable than to the start-up
staging industries such as IT (Information Technology). Recent studies of high
technology industries have shown that:
CEOs in higher technology industries are more inclined to have
backgrounds in research and development and tend to be younger than
CEOs in lower technology industries. Meanwhile, within the high
technology industries, organizations going through growth phases were
more apt to have CEOs with research and development backgrounds than
organizations in more mature phases, which tended to have CEOs with
backgrounds in administration, finance, and marketing. (Keiser, 2004, p. 56)
The insurance industry used to be a more mature and conservative industry, but
now appears to have undergone a rapid transformation, ever since the catalytic repealing
of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 (Neale & Peterson, 2005). The insurance industry has
grown into a more mature and conservative industry although it may be experiencing a
few transformations since the catalytic repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. These
companies are now more aggressive and rely heavily on new technologies such as the
internet to market products and to serve customers. This paper therefore examines
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whether or not the industry’s reliance upon new technologies has resulted in the hiring of
younger CEOs.
The problem statement examines what relationship, if any, exists between a firm’s
performance and a new CEO’s personality and leadership style, as well as his/her
demographics of age, education, and prior experiences.
The following are the research hypotheses:
1) Is there a difference between the new insurance CEOs’ age, their education
level, and tenure before and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in
1999?
2) Is there a correlation between the new CEO’s age, school tier, degree, and
prior experiences and the change in company’s performance?
3) Is there a correlation between the size of the firm (small, medium or large
based on the rank of asset sizes), the new CEO’s origin (insider/outsider) and
tenure, and the change in company’s performance?
4) Is there a difference in independent demographic factors (particularly in age,
level of education, and tenure) among new CEOs of insurance companies and
their counterparts at other financial institutions such as banks and securities,
or their counterparts at IT companies?
The validity of these hypotheses will be tested by comparing the demographics
and job performances of new CEOs at regulated and unregulated companies during their
tenure. Because the financial industries contain both regulated and unregulated
characteristics, a close study of the CEOs of these companies is necessary to illustrate the
relationship between leadership and performance. For the purpose of this research, the
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population has been defined as U.S. companies in the insurance, securities, diversified
financial, commercial banks, and IT industries that file financial statements with a
government agency.
Definition of Key Terms
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Legislation passed by Congress authorizing deposit
insurance and prohibiting commercial banks from owning brokerage firms. Under GlassSteagall, these banks were prohibited from investment banking activities, such as
underwriting corporate securities or municipal revenue bonds. The law was designed to
insulate bank depositors from the risk involved when a bank dealt in securities and to
prevent a banking collapse like the one that occurred in the Great Depression (Downes &
Goodman 1991).
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. Congress passed this act, also known as the
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, on November 4, 1999. This act removed
most of the barriers that existed between the three different financial segments (banks,
investment companies, and insurance companies) and allowed firms in these segments to
cross-sell each other’s products on a much wider scale than previously allowed (Neale &
Peterson, 2005).
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. A U.S. Act of Congress that regulates the
actions of bank holding companies. It required Federal Reserve Board approval for the
establishment of a bank holding company and prohibited bank holding companies
headquartered in one state from acquiring a bank in another state (Downes & Goodman,
1991).
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Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Officer of a firm principally responsible for the
activities of a company (Downes & Goodman, 1991).
Chief Operating Officer (COO). Officer of a firm, usually the president or an
executive vice president, responsible for daily management. Reports to CEO (Downes &
Goodman, 1991).
Chief Financial Officer (CFO). An executive officer who is responsible for
handling funds, signing checks, keeping financial records, and financial planning
(Downes & Goodman, 1991).
Summary
Because of new technologies as well as increased competition, both from within
and from outside the industry, CEOs must be able to sort through and analyze vast
amounts of information. This requires considerable cognitive ability as well as higher
education and training. Moreover, CEOs are under more pressure than ever before to act
quickly, to recognize potential problems or opportunities and to take action immediately,
which betrays a certain willingness to take risks. For these and other reasons, companies
are turning to younger CEOs, as they are more familiar with new technologies, more
open to new ideas and less reluctant to take necessary risks. But how much younger? And
is age any more important than experience, expertise or reputation within a certain
business field?
This study will try to answer these and other questions by examining the
relationship between a company’s performance over time and a new CEO’s personality,
age, education and prior experience. The goal is to establish a prediction model for
companies to aid them in their selection process.
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review
Overview of the Insurance Industry
The insurance industry can be divided into two groups: property-casualty and life
insurance companies. Because insurance products are so closely tied to public welfare,
government regulation and protection are vital in today’s global market, as evidenced by
the recent near collapse of American International Group’s (AIG) (Luhby, 2008). That is
why the Federal government authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend
AIG $85 billion to prevent them from filing bankruptcy. In return, the Federal Reserve
Bank received a 79.9% stake in the company. If AIG had failed, it would have led to the
collapse of other companies that they insure, some of them international, and this would
have resulted not merely in a loss of jobs but also a loss of insurance policies that could
not be replaced (Luhby, 2008).
The intervention of government is not new. During the Great Depression the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (Neale & Peterson, 2005) separated investment and
commercial banking activities. The main goals of the act were to regulate greedy banks in
the pre-depression era, to separate the three financial sectors such as banks, investment
companies, and insurance companies, to reduce excessive risk-taking by financial
institutions, and to restore public confidence in the overall banking system.
In 1945, the McCarran-Ferguson Act gave states the authority to regulate the
business of insurance without interference from federal regulation, unless federal law
specifically provides otherwise. Because of this regulation, the insurance industry could
reside comfortably inside a well protected castle compared with other financial
institutions (Grace & Klein, 2008).
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In 1956, as an extension of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Bank Holding Company
Act was implemented to prevent financial conglomerates from having too much power.
This act further separated financial activities by creating a wall between insurance and
banking (Neale & Peterson, 2005).
On November 4, 1999 Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Yeager, et
al., 2007), also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act. This act deregulated
the financial services industry by expanding the powers of financial institutions. Most of
the barriers that existed between the three different financial sectors were removed. All
three financial sectors were allowed to sell each other’s products and had access to a
broader customer base. Essentially, this act allowed rapid consolidation of the industry.
According to classical economic theory, without any government regulation
individual utility (satisfaction) would be maximized in the long run under perfect
competition (Copeland & Weston, 1992). Even though perfect competition does not exist
and may never have existed, there is still workable competition (Williams, 1987). In their
paper, Neale and Peterson (2005) say that the enhanced competitiveness in the global
economy, the broader customer base, and the potential for consolidation are expected to
lead to greater profitability within the U.S. financial industry.
In order to answer the research questions, the following three areas need to be
reviewed: (a) Leadership Theory based on personality, (b) the selection process of the
new CEO, and (c) the announcement effect of the new CEO. When CEOs are replaced,
questions are asked about the successor (Vancil, 1987). The CEO’s personality, his/her
knowledge of the market and his firm, his prior experiences, and his demographic
information are useful in analyzing and predicting the firm’s future direction.
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Leadership Theories
When a company announces a new CEO, the media (Robbins, 2001) is quick to
describe this person as charismatic, enthusiastic, a great motivator, or perhaps even
savior. These terms are known as traits and allow for concise descriptions that can
provoke a quick emotional response, especially among nervous shareholders or rival
companies. The emphasis on personality is understandable since it has long been
assumed that leaders are successful largely because of innate qualities, not merely
because of their knowledge or experience: “A lot of companies gradually realize that a
great leader is a great leader regardless of the industry. And great leadership is infinitely
more difficult to teach than industry knowledge” (Carey & Ogden, 2000, p. 151)
However, there are many schools of thought in regards to leadership and its
impact on and its role within a company. According to Jago (1982, p. 315), each has its
limits in terms of practical application: “Multiple interpretations of leadership phenomena
exist, each providing some insight into the role of leader but each remaining an
incomplete and wholly inadequate explanation of complex relationship.” It is therefore
helpful to analyze the various features of each before a more detailed discussion of the
importance of personality as outlined in the leadership trait approach theory.
Standard leadership theories. Leadership theories can be divided into three main
categories. The first consists of the trait approach and the style approach, both of which
define leadership from the leader’s point of view (Northouse, 2001). There are other
schools of thought (situational leadership theory, contingency theory, and path-goal
theory) that define leadership as the ability to adapt to the follower and the context. The
third and final category (the leader-member exchange theory) defines leadership as an
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interactive, dyadic relationship between both leaders and followers. There are, of course,
notable differences between theories within the same category. For example, the style
approach (Robbins, 2001) emphasizes the behavior of the leader, whereas the trait
approach focuses on the personality characteristics of the leader.
According to the situational leadership approach (Northouse, 2001), effective
leaders can accurately diagnose the current development level of subordinates in a task
situation and then exhibit the prescribed leadership style that matches that situation. In
other words, leaders analyze the conditions and change their leadership style to best suit
the circumstance. Instead of dictating the environment, they adapt to it.
Similarly, Fiedler’s contingency theory (Robbins, 2001) is also concerned with
styles and situations and provides the framework for effectively matching the leader and
the situation. It is a refined mixture of style approach and situational approach theories.
Path-Goal theory, most of which was developed by House and Aditya (1997),
examines how leaders motivate subordinates to accomplish designated goals. This theory
illustrates how leaders can enhance employee performance and satisfaction by focusing
on employee motivation. The underlying assumption (Northouse, 2001) is based on
expectancy theory. That is to say, subordinates will be motivated if they think that they
are capable of performing their work and that their efforts will result in a certain outcome
or the payoffs for doing their work are worthwhile.
The third category, leader-member exchange theory (LMX theory) (Robbins,
2001), focuses on the leader-member relationship as a priority, and therefore effective
communication in leader-member relationships is essential. This theory recognizes the
existence of in-groups and out-groups within a group or organization. In-group members
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are willing to do more than what is required in their job description and look for
innovative ways to advance the group’s goal. In contrast, out-group members act strictly
within their prescribed organizational roles. The leader’s role is to differentiate between
in-group members and out-group members, giving the former (in-group members) more
responsibilities, more opportunities, and more support.
A fairly recent theory, the transformational leadership approach (Northouse,
2001), does not fall directly into any of the above categories, but instead borrows many
of their ideas. This approach examines the process by which certain leaders are able to
inspire followers to accomplish great things. It is similar to trait theory in that it provides
“individualized consideration and intellectual stimulation” and describes leaders who
possess charisma (Robbins, 2001, p. 329).
Leadership trait approach theory. Leadership trait approach theory was originally
developed from a branch of psychology’s personality theories. This theory, unlike other
personality theories that emphasize the importance of early childhood experience in
personality development, focuses on the present, already developed adult personalities.
Personality is defined as the sum of total ways in which an individual reacts and interacts
with others. It has two important parts: (a) the unique differences that distinguish a
person from everyone else and (b) its relatively stable and enduring quality (Robbins,
2001). Personality can change and develop, but the degree to which change is possible is
partly dependent upon age. Allport and Odbert believed that some traits are inherited and
that each individual has a unique constellation of traits. On the other hand, by using
factor analysis, Cattell claimed that the complexity of human personality could be
explained with only twenty three traits (Morris & Maisto, 2005).
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However, recent scholars have insisted that five traits are sufficient: extroversion,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and culture [openness to
experience] (Robbins, 2001). They also claim that these Big Five dimensions of
personality are reliable predictors of job performance, especially when other criteria such
as technical skills and experience are considered. Judge et al. (2002) concluded that the
five-factor model had multiple correlations with leadership, indicating strong support for
the leader trait perspective as traits are organized according to the five-factor model.
Also, each of these five traits has multiple facets. For example, agreeableness includes
trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, and tenderness (Jang, Livesley,
McCrae, Angleitner, & Riemann, 1998).
After reviewing the literature describing the relationship between personality and
job performance, Barrick and Mount as cited in Judge, Bono, et al. (2002) determined
that the validity of personality as a predictor of job performance is generally quite low.
However, they admitted that when the previous studies were conducted, no well-accepted
taxonomy existed for classifying personality traits. Therefore, it was not possible to
determine whether or not there were consistent, meaningful relationships between
particular personality constructs and performance criteria in different occupations. In
response, Judge, Bono, et al. (2002) suggested replacing the words “job performance”
with “leadership” in Barrick and Mount’s paper. In other words, personality is a predictor
of leadership (Hogan & Kaiser 2005), but not necessarily job performance.
Leadership has two broad categories: leadership emergence and leadership
effectiveness (Judge, Bono, et al., 2002). Leaders emerge when someone within a group
is perceived as leader-like. Thus, leader emergence occurs when an individual is viewed
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as a leader with only limited information about that individual’s performance. This is a
within-group phenomenon. In contrast, leadership effectiveness refers to a leader’s
performance in influencing and guiding the activities of his unit toward achievement of
its goals. This is a between-groups phenomenon.
In a Harvard working paper (Wasserman, Nohria, & Anand, 2001), three scholars
argued that the debate question, “Does leadership matter?” might be misdirected. They
said that the question should be, “When does leadership matter?” They showed that the
impact of CEOs differed markedly by industry, and that CEOs have the most significant
impact where opportunities are scarce or where CEOs have slack resources. Thus, their
study showed that a CEO’s impact is different depending on type of industry and firm
size.
The basic premise (Northouse, 2001) is that human behavior can be summarized
by a few traits. Psychologists say that a trait is a dimension of personality used to
categorize people according to the degree to particular characteristic. In other words,
traits are building blocks of personality. Traits occur in combinations, and these
combinations make each person unique. Traits are organized hierarchically based on how
much they influence behavior. People can have more of a trait by demonstrating their
behavior more frequently with more intensity across a wider range of situation.
Psychologists (Morris & Maisto, 2005) say that traits describe individual
difference; people respond to the same situation in different ways. They also insist that
traits are bipolar; for any trait, there is an opposite.
The trait theories of leadership – theories that sought personality, social, physical,
or intellectual attributes that differentiated leaders from non-leaders – date back to the
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1930s (Robbins, 2001). During this time, research concentrated on determining the
specific traits that clearly differentiated leaders from followers. People assumed potential
leaders could be identified by observing certain traits. Some of these traits, it was
reasoned, could be honed through training and practice, but one still had to be born with
the potential. Leaders could be made, but only if they were born with the right stuff
(Northouse, 2001).
The trait theories were one of the first systematic attempts to study leadership. In
the mid-1900s, research challenged the theories by questioning the universality of
leadership traits. The cumulative findings from more than half a century of research lead
to a conclusion that although some traits may increase the propensity of success as a
leader, none of the traits guarantee success (Robbins, 2001).
In a major review in 1948, Stogdill suggested that no consistent set of traits
differentiated leaders from non-leaders across a variety of situations (Northouse, 2001).
He said that an individual with leadership traits might be a leader in one situation, but not
in another. Rather than being a quality that individuals possessed, leadership was reconceptualized as a relationship between people in a social situation. Personal factors
related to leadership continued to be important, but researchers contended that these
factors were to be considered as relative to the requirements of the situation (Morris &
Maisto, 2005).
Leadership research began with an emphasis on identifying the qualities (traits) of
great individuals. Then it shifted to include the impact of situations on leadership. Most
currently, it has emphasized the behavioral styles of leaders (Robbins, 2001).

26
Leadership can be viewed as a trait or set of traits (Jago, 1982). In other words,
leadership can be viewed as a measurable and quantifiable property possessed by
different people in different amounts. Alternatively, it is possible to focus on observable
leader behaviors rather than on inherent traits. From this perspective, leadership exists
primarily in the actions of the leader. Furthermore, it seems certain background
characteristics (Marsh, 1989) can also be associated with leadership capability. Marsh
quoted Burack’s research in his dissertation paper:
Leaders, if not born, seem to be made early in their lives by their
experiences up to and including high school. While a clear answer to the
question is yet to be determined, indications are that there exist basic
characteristics in people which can readily develop into necessary
leadership qualities under the proper conditions. If these basic ingredients
are not present, training for leadership might well be misplaced. (p. 94)
While no one can argue that good leaders have most or all of the good traits, it is
easy to find effective leaders who have at least some of these traits. Likewise, it is also
easy to find people who exhibit nearly all of these traits, but who are terrible leaders. So
effectiveness and efficiency of leadership would be inadequate until personal and
situational characteristics have been integrated, as Stogdill (1948) predicted.
Although the trait theories are neither accurate nor enough, they do provide
valuable information about leadership. They can be applied to individuals at all levels and
in all types of organizations. Although a definitive set of traits is not provided by the trait
approach (Northouse, 2001), the approach does provide direction in regards to which
traits are good to have if one aspires to take a leadership position. By taking personality
tests and other similar questionnaires, individuals can gain insight into whether or not
they have certain traits deemed important for leadership, and they can pinpoint their
strengths and weaknesses.
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Managers can use information from the trait approach theory to assess where they
stand within their organization and what they need to do to strengthen their position
(Northouse, 2001). It can suggest areas in which their personal characteristics are very
beneficial to the company and areas in which they may wish to receive more training to
enhance their overall approach. Managers can then further develop a deeper
understanding of who they are and how they will affect others in the organization.
According to her dissertation paper regarding personality traits of executive
women (Gmelin, 2005), the personality scores of executive women are consistent with
leadership trait theory. The issue is leadership style caused by personality.
Many scholars believe that the CEO’s personality is a critical and influential
factor in the firm (Miller & Droge, 1986). Miller and Droge assert that the CEO’s
personality impact is greater in small and young firms than in large and old firms (banks
and government included) for the firm’s performance. We can expect the impact of the
CEO to be direct and pervasive.
The CEO as a high achiever (Miller & Droge, 1986) influences the firm’s
structure. So the need for achievement in personality is a critical factor for the successful
companies.
The analysis of CEO’s traits (personality) (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005) is more
important than ever before for successfully implementing major organizational objectives
based on inside and outside environmental changes. Even though those traits are very
subjective and unique to CEOs, and the traits are very tough to convert into numbers for
each potential CEO in order to predict who the right CEO would be for the company,
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fortunately some demographic factors and past experiences through the CEO’s biography
could be used as proxies to predict the firm’s future.
The CEO’s intelligence and mental abilities (Morris & Maisto, 2005) are partly
heredity and partly where and how he has grown up – education, family, and work
environment, etc. Schmidt and Hunter (Judge, et al., 2004) proclaimed that intelligence is
the most important trait or construct in all of psychology, and the most successful trait in
applied psychology. They said that intelligence is one of the best predictors of general job
performance. In the complex jobs, the relationship between intelligence and performance
is stronger.
In a Gallup Poll before the 2000 presidential election (Judge, et al., 2004), 90% of
Americans responded that the candidate should understand complex issues. Judge, et al.
(2004) cite Lord, Foti, and De Vader, who found that intelligence was the only attribute
that is seen as a critical feature that must be possessed by all leaders. They also concluded
that intelligence is a key characteristic in predicting leadership perceptions. But Rubin,
Bartels, and Bommer (Judge, et al., 2004) argued that intelligence was more strongly
related to perceived intellectual competence of the leader than to leadership emergence.
Locke (Judge, et al., 2004) argued that cognitive ability to gather, integrate, and
interpret enormous amounts of information is important for leaders as decision makers.
Leadership also requires a considerable measure of creativity, which is, in turn, a
reflection of a leader’s intelligence. Leaders generate creative solutions on their own and
may stimulate follower creativity through follower intrinsic motivation and high quality
leader-member exchange.
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Rushton (Judge, et al., 2004) concluded that creativity and intelligence are
distinct, but related, constructs. He said that intelligent leaders are not only better
problem solvers, but they are also more likely to become creative and foster the creativity
of their followers.
If people believe that leaders are endowed with certain characteristics, then when
people observe these characteristics in others, they infer leadership or leadership potential
to exist. Rubin et al. (Judge, et al., 2004) noted that individuals seem to share a common
understanding about the traits that leaders possess and these traits are used as benchmarks
for deciding emergent leadership.
Fiedler and Garcia’s cognitive resource theory (Judge, et al., 2004) assume that
intelligence and experience and other cognitive resources are factors in leadership
success. In order to predict leadership success, the level of stress as well as cognitive
capabilities must be considered. Their theory predicts that a leader’s cognitive ability
contributes to followers’ performance only when a leader communicates using directive
behavior.
At the same time, stress (Robbins, 2001) affects the intelligence-decision quality
relationship. The theory predicts that a leader’s experience is positively correlated with
decision quality under high stress. Therefore, a CEO’s past experience or expertise is
highly significant in solving the problems his or her company faces. Fiedler and Garcia
(Robbins, 2001) also propose that leader intelligence and experience is irrelevant for
simple tasks.
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If the above theory is correct, we can conclude that intellect, emotional
motivation, competence, and self discipline are among the most important personality
traits for a successful CEO.
Before repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, barriers to the entry of new firms into a
market were high in the insurance industry. Barriers to the entry (Leftwich & Eckert,
1985) may be inherent in the nature of the market or existing firms and government units
may have erected them. That is, they may either be natural or artificial. The GlassSteagall Act itself (Downes & Goodman, 1991) made CEOs in the insurance industry less
competitive compared with those in the IT and software industries, although it does not
mean that they were less intellectual or less competent. But their decision making choices
had been considerably less than those in other rapid changing industries.
The CEO Selection Process
A Board of Directors must select a CEO who can maximize the firm’s value.
Without any doubt, the Board of Directors (Carey & Ogden, 2000) tries to find the CEO
by considering the firm’s current situation and its future growth and direction. According
to Joos, et al. (2003), four factors should be considered: effort, risk, human capital, and
horizon. Depending upon the firm’s situation, the Board of Directors will have to select
the new CEO based upon the four factors criteria. The most idealistic candidate (Joos, et
al., 2003) would be low effort averse, low risk averse, long horizontal, and most
knowledgeable in both the general and the specific management approaches that relate to
the firm and the industry. In other words, a Board of Directors requires a sincere,
trustworthy, aggressive, younger but experienced, intelligent and intellectual CEO.
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Although all four factors are typically unobservable to outsiders (Joos, et al.,
2003), each factor is correlated with the incoming CEO’s age and the type of firm. The
effort averse factor is directly related to the agency’s problem dealing in the corporate
finance area (Copeland & Weston, 1992). Because a CEO works as an agent for the
stockholders, there is no guarantee that the CEO will always act in their best interest. In
most firms, nontrivial monitoring costs from the owners’ pockets incur to keep the CEO
in line. However, if the CEO has a certain amount of ownership in the firm, monitoring
costs can be reduced.
Start-ups, high growth, and financially distressed firms (Joos, et al., 2003) tend to
hire younger CEOs. Each company has different attitudes toward risk, depended upon the
firm’s financial health. Even though a CEO is low risk averse, he can have a limited
option to take action if the firm is not financially strong. The Board of Directors closely
monitors the CEO even though executive compensation contracts address managerial
incentive problems. Therefore riskier firms tend to appoint younger CEOs (Joos, et al.,
2003).
Due to the CEO’s compensation plan (Joos, et al., 2003), there is some
relationship between the CEO’s age and the firm’s growth option. So if the firm has longterm growth projects, the firm will tend to engage a younger CEO.
Since a CEO’s general management skills, along with firm and industry-specific
knowledge, increase with firm size, there is a positive correlation between firm size and
the CEO’s age (Joos, et al., 2003). Those skills are normally obtained from prior
experience through jobs. Thus, high-tech firms require younger CEOs to be more familiar
with the emerging technologies in their industry. The CEOs of regulated firms that
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operate under more constrained opportunity sets tend to be younger when hired if the
firms do not require general management and firm-specific knowledge. However, if the
regulated firms require industry-specific knowledge, then the CEO’s tend to be older
(Joos, et al., 2003).
Hadlock, Lee, and Parrino (2002) say that utility CEOs tend to be older when
appointed to office and graduate from less prestigious schools with legal backgrounds
when compared to CEOs of unregulated firms. Their interpretation is that managerial
talent and effort are not very important factors of job performance. They also found that
utility firms rarely appoint outsiders as CEOs.
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) suggest that environmental contingencies affect the
replacement of CEOs. In other words, organizations tend to select CEOs to handle
current organizational problems. For example, if firms face uncertainty and instability
derived from competitive interdependence, these firms will likely select new CEOs from
within the industry – from competing firms – in an effort to reduce their competitive
uncertainty.
When powerful CEOs (Westphal & Zajac, 1995) appoint new board members,
they select demographically similar ones. If this is true, incumbent board members will
choose the new CEO based upon similar demographic factors. According to Westphal
and Zajac there is a certain amount of bias in the selection process:
Social psychological studies on performance evaluation and hiring practices
consistently find bias in evaluation decisions in which the parties are
demographically similar. In experimental and field research on hiring
decisions, studies have demonstrated a positive relationship between
applicant-rater similarity and the perceived quality of the applicant. (p. 61)
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Additional evidence suggests that similarity frequently enhances interpersonal
attraction (Bryne, Clore, & Worchel, 1966; Bryne, 1971). Early interpretations of these
findings invoked a reinforcement model, arguing that similarity provides mutual
reinforcement or consensual validation of each individual’s beliefs, thus enhancing
interpersonal attraction and producing bias in evaluation decisions.
When the board of directors selects the new CEO, it is natural to select one with
similar demographic factors, functional background, age, educational level, and
insider/outsider status (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Even though the new CEO is selected
in the company’s best interest, the market could perceive and judge that CEO differently.
A change of CEO is affected by various factors such as competition between top
managers, the role of the Board of Directors, and large blockholders. Warner, Watts, and
Wruck (1988) said that if a firm selects an outsider, the benefits must be greater than the
costs, otherwise insiders’ incentives may diminish and employee morale might suffer.
Moreover, the search for an outsider is a considerable expense for any company and
therefore the selection of an outsider usually occurs when the company enters or expands
into new areas in which the firm has no specific human capital.
Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas (2006) argue that firms tend to promote new
CEOs from within. Outsiders are said to be handicapped. In order to become a new CEO
as an outsider, that CEO must outperform insider candidates. Firms with a product, or
line of business organizational structure, are likely to choose an insider as their CEO.
Carey and Ogden (2000) insist that strong boards must make rigid and systematic
CEO selection standards and link the development of their succession plans to the new
CEO’s compensation. At the same time, the boards need to establish a Global
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Intelligence comprehensive evaluation system to review the talented executives both
from inside and outside the company in order to increase the probability of a successful
succession of the new CEO.
The Announcement Effect of a New CEO on the Stock Market
The stock market immediately reflects the firm’s value based on the perception
and reputation of the new CEO. The large institutional investment company’s analysts
rather than individual investors, judge the new CEO when they buy or sell the firm’s
stocks. When a company first announces a new CEO, the market studies and judges the
CEO based upon his past experiences and accomplishments, leadership style, and
personality based on social and industrial and organizational psychology (Morris &
Maisto, 2005). The market judges whether or not the new CEO can act as a decision
maker and handle the firm’s current and future problems. If the company has existing
problems, then the market asks if he is the right person for the job.
Other scholars (Warner, et al., 1988) begin their arguments with the major
hypothesis that the probability of a top management change is inversely related to stock
price performance. Whenever a CEO is hired or fired, the capital markets react to that
news. Even though the wealth effect for stockholders caused by appointments of new
CEOs (Furtado & Rozeff, 1987) is small, the significance is meaningful. Furtado and
Rozeff found that internal promotions gave good signals to the capital markets rather than
external ones due to the existence of firm-specific human capital and the higher
information costs associated with external hire. At the same time it minimizes the internal
disruption during a change of the CEO (Vancil, 1987). For small companies, the
frequency of internal promotion tends to decline due to less well-developed labor markets
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(Furtado & Rozeff, 1987). Accordingly, the announcement and dismissal effects of a
CEO in the stock market are directly related to shareholder wealth maximization.
In selecting candidates for the CEO position from both the inside and outside,
macro and micro factors should be considered. Micro factors are firm-specific and macro
factors are, in general, non-firm specific. Under limited competition as is found in
insurance and utility industries, micro factors are considered more important than macrofactors. On the other hand, under unlimited competition, macro factors are considered
more important than micro-factors. Therefore, Hi-Tech industries may select their CEO
from the outside more comfortably than a CEO from the inside (Joos, et al., 2003).
Warner, et al. (1988) claim that stock returns are a potential source of
information, even though the top managers’ impact on establishing the firm’s value is not
directly observable. They maintain stock return itself is a noisy measure of management
performance and is influenced by other exogenous factors. In other words, stock return
cannot incorporate all the information about management performance. They hypothesize
that the probability of a top management change is inversely related to stock price
performance. Changes in management are followed by poor stock performance. They
claim that:
Abnormal stock return at announcement is the sum of two components. One is an
information component that is negative if the change signals worse management
performance than anticipated. The second is a real component that is positive if
the change is in shareholders’ interest. A positive net effect is expected only if the
real component is larger in absolute value than the information component.
(Warner, et al., 1988, p. 466)
They then conclude that there is usually no average stock price reaction detected at the
announcement date.
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However, Furtado and Rozeff (1987) say that Warner, et al.’s result was partly
contaminated due to the inclusion of a large number of executive retirements and
departures, and should have been limited only to the appointment of a new CEO.
Empirical research regarding stock price reaction to management change gives
conflicting results about the possible benefits of internal mechanisms of corporate
control.
Summary
In order to ensure that a company evaluating CEO candidates will choose the one
who is most qualified and capable, the following three areas need to be reviewed: (a)
Leadership Theory based on personality, (b) the selection process of the new CEO, and
(c) the announcement effect of the new CEO. When CEOs are replaced, questions are
asked about the successor. The CEO’s personality, his/her knowledge of the market and
his firm, his prior experiences, and his demographic information are useful in analyzing
and predicting the firm’s future direction.
The CEO’s personality is a critical and influential factor in the firm. The analysis
of CEO’s traits (personality) is more important than ever before for successfully
implementing major organizational objectives based on inside and outside environmental
changes. Even though those traits are very subjective and unique to CEOs, and the traits
are very tough to convert into numbers for each potential CEO in order to predict who the
right CEO would be for the company, fortunately some demographic factors and past
experiences through the CEO’s biography could be used as proxies to predict the firm’s
future.
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Since a CEO’s general management skills, along with firm and industry-specific
knowledge, increase with firm size, there is a positive correlation between firm size and
the CEO’s age. Those skills are normally obtained from prior experience through jobs.
In brief, the above argument can be summarized into a simple multiple regression model
as follows:
Company’s performance = age + education level /quality + prior experience +
origin (insider/outsider) + tenure + Є (CEO’s personality and leadership style
+other factors)
However since the CEO’s personality and leadership style could not be assigned
numbers, “Є” was used to denote the CEO’s personality and leadership style.
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Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology
Problem Statement
What relationship, if any, exists between a firm’s performance and a new CEO’s
personality and leadership style, as well as his/her demographics of age, education, and
prior experiences?
Research Hypotheses
Research hypothesis 1. Is there a difference between the new insurance CEOs’
age, their education level, and tenure before and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall
Act in 1999?
(*The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was legislation passed by Congress authorizing deposit
insurance and prohibiting commercial banks from owning brokerage firms. President Bill
Clinton repealed the act in 1999. The repealing of the act reduced the constraints in the
financial industry, thus rendering more competition among financial companies.)
Specific hypotheses:
1. There is/is not a significant difference in the new insurance CEO’s age before
and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.
2. There is/is not a significant difference in the education levels of newly-hired
CEOs in the insurance field prior to and following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act in 1999.
3. There is/is not a significant difference in the new insurance CEO’s tenure
before and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.
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Method
The sample size consists of 110 incoming CEOs from 48 companies in the
insurance industry during the period 1988 to 2006.
For specific hypothesis 1, a two-sample t-test was used is to compare the means
of two populations (groups) by taking independent samples from each. This is sometimes
referred to as a parallel-groups design (Kleinbaum & Kupper, 1978). The mean
represents the center of the population. If the means are different, then the populations are
different. Other parameters of the two populations (such as the variance) are also
considered when performing this analysis.
First, the means and variances for the CEOs’ age, education level, and tenure preand post- 1999 were obtained. The means were then analyzed and the differences
calculated. Then the differences in the means were tested for statistical significance using
a t-test, where the critical value α =0.05. It is assumed that the true difference between the
means is zero.
For specific hypothesis 2, chi-square test (Kleinbaum & Kupper, 1978) was
employed.
A chi square statistic was used to investigate whether distributions of categorical
variables differ from one another. Here education level is a categorical variable.
Eventually each categorical variable is expressed in numerical form. On page 51, a CEO
who has a master degree or above is categorized as “0” and a CEO with a bachelor
degree or less is categorized as “1”.
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This allows for a 2 x 2 contingency table comprising the number of CEOs who
have a master degree or above and number of CEOs with a bachelor degree or less, pre
and post the GBL Act.
For specific hypothesis 3, the same two-sample t-test used in specific hypothesis 1
was used to compare the means of two populations (groups) by taking independent
samples from each.
Research hypothesis 2. Is there a correlation between the new CEO’s age, school
tier, degree and prior experiences and the change in company’s performance?
Specific hypotheses:
1. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in revenue and the
variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs.
2. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in stock price and
the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs.
3. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in return on equity
and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs.
Method
The sample size consists of 214 incoming CEOs from 120 companies in the
financial industry during the period 1988 to 2006. Multiple regression analysis was used
for studying the straight-line relationships among two or more variables. In the more
general multiple regression model, there are p independent variables:

The xes are the independent variables. The y is the dependent variable. The ßs are the
unknown regression coefficients. The critical value α is 0.05.
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The following models were used:
•

Yt (Change in revenue) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) +
β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є

•

Yt (Change in stock price) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) +
β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є

•

Yt (Change in return on equity) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) +
β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є

Research hypothesis 3. Is there a correlation between the size of the firm (small,
medium, or large based on the rank of asset sizes), the new CEO’s origin
(insider/outsider) and tenure, and the change in company’s performance?
Specific hypotheses:
1. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in revenue and
the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.
2. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in stock price and
the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.
3. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in return on equity
and the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.
Method
Same Multiple Regression Analysis was used for studying the straight-line
relationships among two or more variables. The critical value α is 0.05.
The following models were used:
•

Yt (Change in revenue) = β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider)+
β7 (Tenure) + Є
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•

Yt (Change in stock price) = β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider)
+ β7 (Tenure) + Є

•

Yt (Change in return on equity) = β5 (Firm Size)
+ β6 (Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є

Research hypothesis 4. Is there a difference in demographic independent factors
(particularly in age, level of education, and tenure) among new CEOs of insurance
companies and their counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies?
Specific hypotheses:
1. There is/is not a significant difference in the independent demographic factor of
age among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at both other
financial institutions and IT companies.
2. There is/is not a significant difference in the independent demographic factor of
level of education among new CEOs of insurance companies and their
counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies.
3. There is/is not a significant difference in the independent demographic factor of
tenure among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at both
other financial institutions and IT companies.
Method
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) model was used to compare the means of
each independent nominal variable such as age, level of education, and tenure among
CEOS in insurance companies and their counterparts at both other financial institutions
and IT companies. ANOVA is simply an extension of the t-test. ANOVA calculates an F
statistic or F ratio.
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where RSSi is the residual sum of squares of model i. F here is distributed as an Fdistribution, with (p2 − p1, n − p2) degrees of freedom. Here the critical value α is 0.05.
Methodology
As shown in Chapter 2, the stock price movements that subsequently follow the
announcement of the new CEOs are related to reputation (Karuna, 2006) - skills,
capabilities, and performances - which in turn are derived from unique leadership.
Furthermore, leadership style is related to personal traits as well as other demographic
factors that include: age, level of education (school tier and type of degree), prior
experiences (whether as a Chief Operating Officer (COO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
or otherwise), the size of the firm, the new CEO’s origin (whether as an insider/outsider),
and tenure.
There are limitations in this study. Because a company’s performance is not
solely depended on one CEO’s leadership, we have to add each division’s head in the
organization to this study in order to get the clear result. A CEO has a power to hire a
core team of unusually qualified persons (Marsh, 1989) in order to cope with the
problems and uncertainties in the future.
Sample selection. The population is made up of U.S. companies in the insurance,
securities, diversified financial, commercial banks, and IT industries that file financial
statements with a government agency.
First, sample companies are chosen from the 2007 annual edition of Fortune
magazine’s “Fortune 1000” companies. Companies are ranked by revenue. The sample
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size is 264 incoming CEOs from 120 companies from 1988 to 2006. The sample size of
financial industry consists of 214 incoming CEOs from 95 companies whereas that of the
insurance consists of 110 incoming CEOs from 48 companies, and sample size of IT
industry consists of 50 incoming CEOs from 25 companies. However, depending upon
each hypothesis, sample sizes are different because of insufficient data. For example, an
incoming CEO’s age was not available but tenure was available in one set of data. Hence
the sample sizes are different in the output of tests in chapter 4.
Companies were excluded if those companies are delisted from stock exchanges
through merger, acquisition, or change of company’s structure. All statistical data, such
as company revenues, were obtained from numbers reported by Fortune magazine,
Standard & Poor’s Net Advantage, and Yahoo! Finance. The NCSS 2001 statistic
software package was used to analyze the collected data. Other demographical data were
obtained from online sources such as Who’s Who in Finance and Industry, LexisNexis
Academics, Reuters, Yahoo! Finance, Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on line, and U.S. News
and World Report. CEO’s name, age, prior experience, and tenure were mainly collected
from LexisNexis Academic.
IRB approval. The researcher completed the National Institutes of Health’s Webbased training course, “Protecting Human Research Participants,” sponsored by the NIH
Office of Human Subjects Research on March 26, 2008. The researcher obtained IRB
approval to proceed with the research. The study was considered exempt as the research
was limited to secondary data available to the public in books, periodicals and on-line
resources. The study did not involve personal interviews or surveys.

45
Test Measures
Dependent Variable(s):
•

Change in revenue – Observe change in revenue during new CEO’s
tenure.

•

Change in stock price – Observe stock price changes during new CEO’s
tenure.

•

Change in return on equity – Observe the change in return on equity
during new CEO’s tenure. Return on equity is the amount, expressed as a
percentage, earned on a company’s common stock investment for a given
period. It is calculated by dividing common stock equity (net worth) at the
beginning of the accounting period into net income for the period after
preferred stock dividends but before common stock dividends (Downes &
Goodman, 1991).

Independent Variable(s):
•

Age – the new CEO’s age his first year in office

•

Level of education – the school tier and type of degree obtained
a) School Tier – school rank, according to U.S. News and World
Report
b) Type of Degree – Bachelors, Masters, Ph.D, etc.

•

New CEO’s prior experiences and expertise – previous job positions, such
as Chief Operating Officer (COO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), CEO of
another company or other

•

Company size rank – determined by annual revenue in the Fortune.
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•

Insider/Outsider – whether the new CEO is from within the firm or is an
outsider.

•

Tenure – the period the new CEO is in office (the length of time that new
CEO position is occupied)

Test Models
The following three regression models were used:
•

Yt (Change in revenue) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + β2 (School
Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + β5 (Firm Size) + β6
(Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є

•

Yt (Change in stock price) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + β2
(School

Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + β5 (Firm

Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є
•

Yt (Change in return on equity) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + β2
(School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + β5 (Firm Size)
+ β6 (Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є

For the characteristics of these data, multiple regression analysis with dummy
variables was used. A dummy variable or indicator variable (Kleinbaum & Kupper, 1978)
is any variable in a regression equation that takes on a finite number of variables for the
purpose of identifying different categories of a nominal variable. Examples of dummy
variables include the following:
1

if the school is in tier 1

0

if the school is in tier 2

-1

if the school is in tier 3 or 4

β2 =
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School tiers are based on data from U.S. News and World Report (2006)

1

if CEO has a BA (AB) /BS degree or below

0

if CEO has a Master degree or above

β3 =

Some CEOs have a BS degree in accounting, economics, political science,
social science, finance, business, commerce, law or industrial management. However,
those BS degrees are changed to BA degrees. A BA degree in engineering, applied
math, or statistics is changed to BS degree.
In the graduate degree, a MS degree in operation research, industrial
management, finance, banking, management, management information, or actuarial
study is equivalent to MBA degree.

β4 =

β5 =

1

if CEO was previously a COO (Chief Operating Officer)

0

otherwise

-1

if CEO was previously a CFO (Chief Financial Officer)

1

if firm size is below rank 300 according to Fortune magazine

0

if firm size is above rank 301, but below 700

-1

if firm size is above rank 701, but below 1000

1

if the CEO is from inside, or within, the firm

0

if the CEO is from outside the firm

β6 =
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Before becoming a CEO, if he/she was not at the company, the CEO is regarded as
an outsider even though most of his time was spent at that company. For example, CEO
A spent most of his life in company X before moving to Company Y. He returns to
company X to be a CEO after spending two years in company Y. In this case he is still
regarded as an outsider.
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Chapter 4 – Results
The following is an examination of the findings related to the research
hypotheses in Chapter 3. Each research hypothesis and its null hypothesis is presented
followed by the findings, which are displayed in both table and visual form.
Research Hypothesis 1
Is there a difference between the new insurance CEOs’ age, their education level,
and tenure before and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999?
(*The Glass- Steagall Act of 1933 was legislation authorizing deposit insurance and
prohibiting commercial banks from owning brokerage firms. President Clinton repealed
the Act in 1999, reducing the constraints in the financial industry and thus rendering
more competition among financial companies.)
Specific hypothesis 1. There is/is not a significant difference in the new insurance
CEO’s age before and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.
Appendix A shows that there was an increase of approximately three years in the
average age of new CEOs following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. The
time frame for this comparison is from 1988 to 2006. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the
average age of new CEOs following deregulation is slightly older than the average age of
new CEOs prior to deregulation. Before deregulation, previous CEOs’ offspring and
relatives became CEOs at a younger age because regulated firms are less complex and
easier to manage (Joos, et al., 2003). The value of α is 0.031, which is less than the 5%
critical level. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis.
Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 1
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There is a significant difference in a new insurance CEO’s age before and after
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.
Specific hypothesis 2. There is/is not a significant difference in the education
levels of newly-hired CEOs in the insurance field prior to and following the repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.
The number of CEOs who have a graduate degree or an undergraduate degree is
shown in Table 1. At a value of α = 0.157, which is greater than the 5 percent critical
level, there is not a significant difference therefore the alternate hypothesis is rejected.
Chi square was used to test the specific hypothesis 2.
Table 1
CEO’s Education Level Pre and Post GBL (1999)

Bachelor
Graduate

Before GBL
39
31

After GBL
14
23

Accept the null hypothesis for specific hypothesis 2.
There is not a significant difference in the education levels of newly-hired CEOs
in the insurance field prior to and following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.
As Table 2 shows, since 1988 an increasing number of incoming CEOs have more
MBA degrees. As explained in the previous chapter, the incoming CEOs are becoming
more professional. The securities industry has the highest proportion, 55 % of CEOs with
MBA, followed by commercial banks (44%), and diversified financial industry (39%) in
the financial industries. The industry with the lowest percentage of CEOs with MBAs is
healthcare (20%) and the property and casualty insurance industry with 21%.

51
The above data are not surprising given the CEO’s role as decision-maker in the
rapidly changing and highly competitive world of business. Today a CEO must have a
professional education background to know how to process information and act upon it, or
to predict how competitors might act if given the same data. MBA degrees give future
CEOs the thinking skills necessary to put fundamental business concepts and theories into
practice.
Table 2
The CEOs Who Had an MBA Degree vs. Non MBA Degree Between 1988 and 2006
# of Companies

# of CEOs

# of MBA

# of non-

MBA
P&C
Life & Health
Healthcare
Commercial Bank
Diversified Financial
Securities
Information Technology
Computer Software
Internet Services and
Retailing
Financial Data Services

23
14
11
23
11
13
6
7
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38
25
54
28
22
16
17

10 (21%)
12 (32%)
5 (20%)
24(44%)
11(39%)
12(55%)
2(13%)
4(24%)

7

9
8

4(44%)
4(50%)

5

(MS)
11
8
5
7
7
2
(6)
(2)
(2)
0

•

# of CEOs who have only BA/BA or below are not counted on the above table.

•

( %) is a percentage of # of MBA / # of CEOs

•

( ) is # of MS degree.
Most finance major graduate students with MBA degrees join high paying security

and investment companies as well as diversified financial companies on Wall Street
(Myser, 2009) and in commercial bank areas. This trend is partly due to the atmosphere
within these industries and the professional knowledge that is required because of the
complexity of the work itself. The security industry in particular must compete with
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investment companies throughout the world by using quick and precise judgment.
Moreover, the CEOs in this industry must have multi-dimensional intelligence to digest and
to overcome in order to endure the higher stress level.
The educational data for the IT industries in Table 2 show that CEOs in the IT
industry have fewer MBA degrees than their counterparts in the financial industries. On
the other hand, the IT industry has a higher number of CEOs with MS degrees.
Similarly, the financial data services and the internet service and retailing
companies have a higher proportion of CEOs with MBA degrees than do their
counterparts in computer software and information technology, no doubt because of the
nature of the work itself. Financial data services and internet service and retailing are
more business oriented and much more competitive than information technology
companies, who are often forced to specialize, thus having fewer direct competitors.
Specific hypothesis 3. There is/is not a significant difference in the new insurance
CEO’s tenure before and after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.
Appendix B shows the result of two-sample test for CEOs’ adjusted tenure. The
tenure of a current incumbent CEO is based on year 2006. However, adjusted tenure is
excluded if a current CEO has continued to serve in this capacity for less than 7 years. In
other words, current CEOs are not included unless they have served in this capacity (for
the same company) for at least seven years.
The results show that since 1999, 30 percent of CEOs are still working as CEOs
for the same company, so tenure cannot yet be determined. As previously mentioned, the
period after 1999 (6 years) is far shorter than the period before 1999 (12 years), so the
data may not be unbiased. This study does not include data from 2007 and 2008, mainly
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because of the current recession, which began in 2007. The thinking here is that in many
cases the performance of CEOs often had little or nothing to do with the performance or
failure of a business.
As Appendix B shows, the value of α is 0.000, which is less than the 5% critical
level. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis. However, because of the shorter period
range after 1999, this result might be inconclusive. However, if we assume that CEOs
hired after 1999 remain in this position for five more years, the average, approximately
10.569 years (5.569 + 5.0), is still much less than the average of those hired before
1999, approximately 15 years (14.958). As expected, the average tenure of CEOs is
decreasing significantly.
Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 3.
There is a significant difference in the new insurance CEO’s tenure before and
after the repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.
Research Hypothesis 2
Is there a correlation between the new CEO’s age, school tier, degree,
and prior experiences and the change in company’s performance?
Specific hypotheses
1. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in revenue and the
variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs.
2. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in stock price and
the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs.
3. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in return on equity
and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs.
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Method
The following models were used:
•

Yt (Change in revenue) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) +
β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є

•

Yt (Change in stock price) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) +
β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є

•

Yt (Change in return on equity) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) +
β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є

In multiple regression output, the coefficient of determination, R2, is a useful tool
which gives the proportion of the variance of dependent variable that is predictable from
the independent variables. The coefficient of determination is a measure to determine
how much the dependent variable can be predicted using a certain model. For example, if
R2 is 0.46, it means that 46 percent of the total variation in Y can be explained by the
linear relationship between X and the values of Y in the regression model. The rest 0.54
(54%) of the total variation in Y cannot be explained.
R, correlation coefficient, may be defined either as a ratio or a percentage. Since
we use the percentage form, its values can range from minus one to one. A value of R
near 0.0 indicates no linear relationship between the Y and the Xs, while a value near 1.0
indicates a perfect linear fit. Although popular, R should not be used indiscriminately or
interpreted without scatter plot support for each of independent variables. Moreover, it is
important to check the F-ratio in the analysis of variance to see if correlation is
significant.
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The company performance data are based on each company’s fiscal year. For
example, in the financial industry, 99% of the companies have accounting periods that
end on December 31st of each year. However, the accounting periods in IT and software
industries often vary, with some periods ending on March 31, June 30, or January 31, etc.
Therefore, for example, if a CEO is appointed on September 1, 2000 the
company’s performance is based on year 2001 when that company’s accounting period
ends on December 31. In other words, the figures for 2000 belong to the prior CEO.
However, if a CEO is appointed on July 1st on exactly middle of a year the company
performance data are assigned to both CEOs.
Even though some companies were listed as Fortune 1000 companies, these
companies are excluded if they are acquired by or have merged with other companies, or
if they have been de-listed (dropped) from the stock market because of a change in the
company’s structure (i.e. from stock company to mutual company). The company’s
performance data unit is a million dollar.
Specific hypothesis 1. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change
in revenue and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new
CEOs.
Appendix C gives the output of the model in the following equation: Yt (Change
revenue) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior
Experiences) + Є. The output is displayed to explain the relationship between the change
in revenue and the independent variables such as incoming CEO’s age, school tier, level
of education (degree), and prior experience. As the Pearson correlations matrix shows,
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prior experience, 0.076, correlates more closely with a change in revenue than with the
other independent variables.
In this model the coefficient of determination, R2, is only 0.011, which says that
there is little way of prediction by the independent variables of age, level of education,
and prior experience for the dependent variable, the change in revenue.
Since the F-ratio is 0.275, giving α a value of 0.948, which is greater than the 5 percent critical
level, the null hypothesis is accepted.
Accept the null hypothesis for specific hypothesis 1.
There is not a significant correlation between the change in revenue and the
variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs.
Specific hypothesis 2. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change
in stock price and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new
CEOs.
Appendix D shows the output of the model Yt (Change in stock price) = β0 + β1
(Incoming CEO’s age) +β2 (School Tier) + β3 (Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + Є.
The data suggest that undergraduate school tier has a higher negative correlation with the
change in stock price. This is followed by data showing incoming CEO’s age, level of
degree, and prior experience. The value of R2, 0.041, is higher than 0.011 in the previous
model. So change in stock price is a better predictor with four independent variables than
change in revenue. CEOs are more concerned with the change of stock price which
reflects the value of the firm.

Only the null hypothesis of the schools in tiers 3 or 4 coded as “-1” is rejected. The
α level is 0.047 which is less than 0.05, which means there is a significant correlation
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between the change in stock price and the CEOs having graduated from a school in tier 3
or 4 which is not good private or public school. This is the result of simple correlation
between change in stock price and schools in tiers 3 or 4.
The F-ratio equals 1.047, giving α value of 0.397, which is greater than the 5 percent
critical level, and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted.
Accept the null hypothesis for specific hypothesis 2.
There is not a significant correlation between the change in stock price and the
variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs. There is,
however, a significant correlation between the change in stock price and school tier 3 or
4.
Specific hypothesis 3. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change
in return on equity and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for
new CEOs.
As Appendix E shows, there is some correlation between the change in return on
equity and the variables of age, 0.171, and prior experience, -0.134. The correlation
between the variables of level of education and school tier and the change in return on
equity is much lower. The value of R2, 0.204, is more predictable than the previous two
instances of R2, 0.01 and 0.04 respectively. Since the value of the F-ratio equals 6.047,
giving α value of 0, which is less than at the critical level of 0.05, the null hypothesis is
rejected.
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Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 3.
There is a significant correlation between the change in return on equity and the
variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience for new CEOs.
Research Hypothesis 3
Is there a correlation between the size of the firm (small, medium, or large based
on the rank of asset sizes), the new CEO’s origin (insider/outsider) and tenure, and the
change in the company’s performance?
Specific hypotheses
1. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in revenue and the
variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.
2. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in stock price and the
variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.
3. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change in return on equity and
the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.
Method
The following models were used for insider and outsider separately.
•

Yt (Change in revenue) = β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider)
+ β7 (Tenure) + Є

•

Yt (Change in stock price) = β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider)
+ β7 (Tenure) + Є

•

Yt (Change in return on equity) = β5 (Firm Size)+ β6 (Insider/Outsider) +
β7 (Tenure) + Є
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Specific hypothesis 1. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change
in revenue and the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.
Appendix F shows the result of the model Yt (Change in revenue) = β5 (Firm
Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є. The value of R2, 0.224, has improved
significantly when compared to the previous model in research hypothesis 2. As the
correlation matrix shows, there is greater predictability between change in revenue and a
firm’s size and tenure.
Since the value of the F-ratio equals 6.435, giving α a value of 0.0001, which is
less than the 5 % critical level, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 1.
There is a significant correlation between the change in revenue and the variables
of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.
Specific hypothesis 2. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change
in stock price and the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.
Appendix G shows the result of the multiple regression model Yt (Change in
stock price) = β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є. The value of R2 is
0.185. Since the value of the F-ratio equals 3.235, giving α value of 0.018, which is less
than at the critical level of 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected. Apart from the adjusted
tenure, there is not a significant correlation between the change in stock price and the
variables of firm size and the new CEO’s origin. Tenure is one of the most important
factors affecting the stock price, the value of the firm. That is to say, the volatility of
stock price is closely related with the CEO’s tenure.
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Since the value of the F-ratio equals 3.235, giving α a value of 0.018, which is less than
the 5 percent critical level, the null hypothesis is rejected
Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 2.
There is a significant correlation between the change in stock price and the
variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.
Specific hypothesis 3. There is/is not a significant correlation between the change
in return on equity and the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure
Appendix H shows the result of the model Yt (Change in return on equity) = β5
(Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider) + β7 (Tenure) + Є in research hypothesis 3. The value
of R2 is 0.173. The value of the F-ratio equals 2.930, giving α a value of 0.029, which is
less than the 5 percent critical level, therefore the null hypothesis is rejected.
Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 3.
There is a significant correlation between the change in return on equity and the
variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.
Research Hypothesis 4
Is there a difference in demographic independent factors (particularly in age, level
of education, and tenure) among new CEOs of insurance companies and their
counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies?
Specific hypotheses
1. There is/is not a significant difference in independent demographic factor of
age, among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at both
other financial institutions and IT companies.
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2. There is/is not a significant difference in independent demographic factor of
level of education among new CEOs of insurance companies and their
counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies.
3. There is/is not a significant difference in independent demographic factor of
tenure among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at both
other financial institutions and IT companies.
Method
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) model was used to compare the means of
each independent nominal variable such as age, education level, and tenure among CEOs
of insurance companies and their counterparts at other financial institutions and IT
companies. ANOVA is simply an extension of the t-test. ANOVA calculates an F
statistic or F ratio.

where RSSi is the residual sum of squares of model i. F here is distributed as an Fdistribution, with (p2 − p1, n − p2) degrees of freedom.
Analysis of Variance can be used when the following assumptions are met:
•

The data are continuous (not discrete).

•

The data follow the normal probability distribution. Each group is
normally distributed about the group mean.

•

The variances of the populations are equal.

•

The groups are independent. There is no relationship among the
individuals in one group as compared to another.
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•

Each group is a simple random sample from its population. Each
individual in the population has an equal probability of being selected
in the sample.

Specific hypothesis 1. There is/is not a significant difference in the independent
demographic factor of age, among new CEOs of insurance companies and their
counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies.
Here the value of the F-ratio equals 7.66, giving α a value of 0.001 (see Appendix I),
which is less than the 5 % critical level. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Accept the alternative hypothesis for specific hypothesis 1.
There is a significant difference in the independent demographic factor of age
between both new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at other financial
institutions, and IT companies.
Specific hypothesis 2. There is/is not a significant difference in the independent
demographic factor of level of education among new CEOs of insurance companies and
their counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies.
Since the value of F-ratio equals 1.73, giving α value of 0.179 (see Appendix J),
which is greater than the 5 % critical level, the null hypothesis is accepted.
Accept the null hypothesis for specific hypothesis 2.
There is not a significant difference in the independent demographic factor of
level of education among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at
both other financial institutions and IT companies.
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Specific hypothesis 3. There is/is not a significant difference in the independent
demographic factor of tenure among new CEOs of insurance companies and their
counterparts at both other financial institutions and IT companies.
Since the value of the F-ratio equals 1.49, giving α a value of 0.227 (see
Appendix K) which is greater than the 5 % critical level, the null hypothesis is accepted.
Accept the null hypothesis for specific hypothesis 3.
There is not a significant difference in the independent demographic factor of
tenure among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at both other
financial institutions and IT companies.
Summary
Research hypothesis 1. The findings indicate that there is indeed a significant
difference in a new insurance CEO’s age and tenure before and after the repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1999. However, the findings also indicate that there is little or no
difference in education level.
Research hypothesis 2. The findings show that there is not a significant
correlation between a new CEO’s age, school tier, degree and prior experiences, and a
company’s change in revenue. There is also no significant correlation between the above
demographic factors and the change in stock price.
There is, however, a significant correlation between the change in stock price and
a new CEO who graduated from school tier three or four. There is also a significant
correlation between the change in return on equity and the variables of age, school tier,
degree, and prior experience.
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Research hypothesis 3. The findings indicate that there is a significant correlation
between changes in revenue, changes in stock price, and changes in return on equity and
the variables of firm size, the new CEO’s origin, and tenure.
Research hypothesis 4. The findings show that there is a significant difference in
the independent demographic factor of age among new CEOs of insurance companies
and their counterparts at other types of financial institutions or their counterparts at IT
companies. However, there is no significant difference in the level of education or tenure.
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Chapter 5–Major Findings and Conclusions, Recommendations, and Summary
This chapter provides an overall summary of the dissertation. The problem
statement, the purpose of the study, literature review, and the methodology used to find
the results to the research questions are addressed again. Finally, the summary of the
major research findings from the data are presented with the recommendation of further
studies.
Major Findings and Conclusions
The research findings of this study were presented in Chapter 4. Statistical and
descriptive procedures for the research questions were delineated along with findings.
From these findings we drew the conclusions described below.
Research hypothesis 1 looked at whether or not there was a significant difference
between the new insurance CEOs’ age, their education level, and tenure before and after
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1999. The findings indicate that there was indeed a
significant difference in a new insurance CEO’s age and tenure before and after the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1999. However, the findings also indicate that there is
little or no difference in education level.
Appendix I shows that there is an increase of approximately three years in the
average age of new CEOs following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. As
mentioned in Chapter 1, the average age of new CEOs following deregulation is slightly
older than the average age of new CEOs prior to deregulation. Before deregulation,
previous CEOs’ offspring and relatives became CEOs at a younger age because regulated
firms were less complex and easier to manage (Joos, et al., 2003).
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It is also interesting to note that, according to the demographic data, when
incumbent CEOs are replaced from within a company that the successor is always
younger. Only when a company is hiring from the outside, after an internal
scandal for example, do they tend to select someone older. This was an altogether
unexpected finding.
In regards to education levels, even though there is not a significant
difference at the critical level, CEOs who have been hired after 1999 have a
higher percentage of master’s degrees. Therefore, we can conclude that the
average level of higher education among incoming CEOs post 1999 is higher than
in years prior.
The three specific hypotheses in research hypothesis 2 looked at whether there is
a significant correlation between a new CEO’s age, education level, and prior
experiences, and the company’s performance. The findings show that there is not a
significant correlation between a new CEO’s age, school tier, degree and prior
experiences, and a company’s change in revenue. There is also no significant correlation
between the above demographic factors and the change in stock price. There is, however,
a significant correlation between the change in stock price and a new CEO who graduated
from school tier three or four. There is also a significant correlation between the change
in return on equity and the variables of age, school tier, degree, and prior experience.
The three specific hypotheses in research hypothesis 3 were used to determine if
there is a significant correlation between the size of the firm (small, medium, or large
based on annual revenue), the CEO’s origin (insider/outsider) and tenure, and the
company’s performance. First, there is a significant correlation between the change in
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revenue and the variables of firm size, the CEO’s origin, and tenure. Second, there is a
significant correlation between the change in stock price and the variables of firm size,
the CEO’s origin, and tenure. Third, there is a significant correlation between the change
in return on equity and the variables of firm size, the CEO’s origin, and tenure.
As per the results of research hypotheses 2 and 3, the new CEOs try to maximize
the stockholder’s wealth through the change of return on equity. At the same time, the
size of the firm, the CEO’s origin, and tenure are more significantly correlated with the
company’s performance than a new CEO’s age, education level, and prior experiences.
Tenure and the size of the firm are especially important factors in predicting the future
company’s performance.
The last research hypothesis tested whether there is a significant difference in
independent demographic factors such as age, level of education, and tenure among
CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at both other financial institutions
and IT companies. The findings show that there is a significant difference in the
independent demographic factor of age between new CEOs of insurance companies and
their counterparts at other types of financial institutions and IT companies. However,
there is no significant difference in the level of education or tenure.
These results show that there is difference in age because of industry
characteristics, but the factors such as level of education and tenure are not big
differences among new CEOs of insurance companies and their counterparts at other
types of financial institutions or their counterparts at IT companies.
Finally, after removing underperformed CEO’s data so as to determine the
successful CEO’s demographic factors, we can conclude that the outperformed CEO is
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slightly above 48 years old, and would be slightly older if we removed the founders of
companies and their offspring. In addition, the successful CEO is more often an insider
with previous COO title and a graduate from school tiers 1 and 2 with preferably a master
degree. This finding applies to firm size above 700th rank. Finally, the ideal tenure for a
CEO is between 10 and 12 years. Three multiple regression models are given in the
appendix , each giving a detailed descriptive summary and the output of multiple
regression for outperformed CEOs.
Given these findings, when a Board of Directors selects a new CEO they must give
the above demographic factors priority if all other factors are equal, though these
demographic factors may vary between industries. For example, until December 9, 2009,
Bank of America’s Board (Carney, 2009) still could not find the right CEO. The bank
was considering both inside and outside candidates to succeed the incumbent CEO, Ken
Lewis. In this situation, the bank’s fist course of action could be to apply my multiple
regression formula in order to better evaluate several candidates.
Yt (Change in revenue) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + β2 (School Tier) +
β3(Degree) + β4 (Prior experiences) + β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider) +
β7 (Tenure) + Є
Estimated Model
Yt (Change in Revenue)= -28569.30+ 586.12*Age+ 10865.22*(Education Level=0)10754.31*(Firm Size=-1)-11818.34*(Firm Size=0)-4071.79*(O=0)-1793.70*(Prior
Exp=-1)+ 7860.67*(School Tier=-1)+ 2635.33*(School Tier=0)+ 972.71*Tenure
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To illustrate how this formula would work, let us assume that Bank of
America’s board has two candidates and that the candidates’ demographic factors
are as shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Demographics of Imaginary Bank of America CEO Candidates
Candidate A

Candidate B

Age

49

52

School Tier

2

1

Degree

MBA

BA

Prior Experience

COO

CFO

Insider/Outsider

Insider

Outsider

Expected Tenure

9

9

Because we already know the size of the firm (1), we do not need to include
this factor in the formula. When we plug in the above candidate’s demographic
factors into the Estimated Model 1 above, the change in revenue ($mil) after the
selection of candidate A is 22,405.53. In contrast, for candidate B, the change in
revenue is 4,797.84. Therefore Candidate A should be given greater
consideration.
On December 16, Bank of America’s board of directors chose consumer
banking chief Brian Moynihan, 50, to replace Ken Lewis as CEO on January 1,
2010 (Brandon, 2009). Dr. Walter E. Massey, chairman of Bank of America, who
led the CEO search, said “Brian’s wide range of experience, his relationship
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inside and outside of the company, and his demonstrated ability to understand
business dynamics and effect constructive change made him the best person for
the position” (Brandon, 2009). The new CEO, Brian Moynihan, is a graduate of
Brown University and the University of Notre Dame Law School. He faces
regulatory investigations into the bank’s 2008 acquisition of Merrill Lynch.
As one can see, the above model is very practical and easy to apply when
searching for a new CEO. However, this should be followed by a detailed
interview asking candidates what course of action they would take based on the
company’s current situation.
This study examined the relationship between the financial performance of a
company over time and specific demographic factors of the company’s CEO,
including age, tenure, education and prior experience, as well as whether he/she
was hired from within or outside the company. The goal is to establish a
prediction model for companies to aid them in their selection of a new CEO. This
prediction model is only applied to the financial industries in selecting a new
CEO. This model also supports Hogan and Kaiser’s leadership definition that
leadership should be defined in terms of the ability to build and maintain a group
that performs well compared to its competition and be evaluated in terms of the
performance of the group over time (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). At the same time,
the model used to support the selection of a new CEO can be changed dependent
upon the size of firms, tenure, age, and the types of firms whether regulated or
unregulated (Joos, et al., 2003).
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The average age of new CEOs following deregulation is slightly older than
the average age of new CEOs prior to deregulation. Before deregulation, previous
CEOs’ offspring and relatives became CEOs at a younger age because regulated
firms are less complex and easier to manage. Finally the model supports Keiser’s
claim that CEOs are becoming professionalized with higher degrees such as
MBA, MS, MA, or JD because of the intellectual difficulty of the job and the
extensive training required (Keiser, 2004).
Recommendations
This study has focused on the CEOs of large, Fortune 1000 companies.
However, in the real world, a company is not operated solely by the CEO, even
though he or she plays a vital role in the company’s success. Newly appointed
CEOs most often appoint their immediate followers or people they have known
throughout their career, people who will assist them in accomplishing both their
own personal goals and the company’s goals.
Therefore, further research should focus on the study of a CEO’s
immediate followers, such as the CEOs of affiliate companies, or divisional
heads, and the roles they play in a company’s success. By analyzing their personal
traits or demographic factors we can study how the organizational framework and
chemistry influence company performance as a whole.
During this present economic crisis, several companies which were listed
in the Fortune 500 have collapsed or have been acquired by other competitors. If
the current recession lasts much longer, many more companies will have gone
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bankrupt. Therefore, there is more pressure than ever before for CEO’s and their
immediate followers to steer there companies through this time of crisis.
Because there is a significant time gap between the period before 1999 and
the period after, the study of tenure is limited. If a study is carried out in another 6
years, the results should clarify the results of this study.
For the study of CEOs in the insurance industry, which consist of two
types of companies, mutual and stock (Williams, 1987). For the purposes of this
paper, CEOs of mutual companies have been excluded because a company’s stock
performance cannot be studied. Therefore, further research is needed to
understand the relationship between their changes in revenue and net income and
the CEOs’ demographic factors. Because their stocks are not traded in the stock
markets, there may be differences in demographic factors such as tenure, age, and
level of education. In the execution of strategic planning, the CEOs of mutual
companies might be more powerful than their counterparts in the stock
companies, as they do not have to pay attention to their own daily stock
movement and other factors related to stock movement. On the other hand,
because there are no monitoring forces such as shareholders, they may be more
resistant to both change and risk. Sometimes they might not notice that their own
mistakes have resulted in poor planning and execution. If a CEO in a mutual
company is not a good leader, the company’s future will be disastrous because
there is no strong monitoring power like in a stock company.
Another area ripe for further study is the relationship between company’s
debt ratio and the demographic factors of its CEO, such as age, education level
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and prior experience. A company which has a high debt ratio needs a CEO who is
able to endure high levels of stress and still perform well, or perhaps a more
optimistic, sociable personality that can inspire others.
It would be interesting to study the hiring rates and performance of CEOs
with only undergraduate degrees. There might be significant differences in their
traits and their performance, depending on their major. In the Information
Technology and Computer Software areas, several of the CEOs dropped out of
school without receiving their bachelor degree. This would not be expected in
other industries. Founding new companies in the financial industries, for example,
is virtually impossible due to the huge of initial investment. Perhaps, future
studies linking various educational backgrounds with success in specific
industries might throw more light on the importance of education on a CEOs
future success. In other words, the success of CEOs may not only depend on the
amount of higher education, but on specific majors that best prepare them for
success.
Because of non-numerical value, personality and leadership style were
excluded in this research. However, if the personality and leadership style data
can be obtained from the well designed questionnaire, we can add these data
through encoding to our model. In that case the model would be far more robust.
It would support Hogan and Kaiser’s (2005) argument.
Finally it would be interesting to study the relationship between the
change in a company’s performance and other demographic factors. For example,
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if the CEO’s compensation factors are added to the multiple regression estimated
model, the results will likely be more robust.
Summary
Because of new technologies as well as increased competition, from both within
and outside the industry, CEOs must be able to sort through and analyze vast amounts of
information. This requires considerable cognitive ability as well as higher education and
training. Moreover, CEOs are under more pressure than ever before to act quickly, to
recognize potential problems or opportunities and to take action immediately. For these
and other reasons, companies are turning to “younger” CEOs with shorter tenure than
incumbent CEOs, as they are more familiar with new technologies, better able to endure
high stress environments, more open to new ideas and less reluctant to take necessary
challenge.
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APPENDIX A
Two-Sample Test Report for CEO’s Ages Pre and Post 1999
Descriptive Statistics Section
Standard
Standard
Variable
Count
Mean Deviation
Error
Age pre- 1999 57
47.72
7.70
1.02 45.68
Age post 1999 36
50.94
5.46
0.91 49.10
Note: T-alpha (Age before GBL) = 2.0032, T-alpha (Age after GBL) = 2.0301

95% LCL
of Mean
49.76
52.79

95% UCL
of Mean

Equal-Variance T-Test Section
Alternative
Hypothesis
T-Value
Difference <> 0
-2.1883
Difference < 0
-2.1883
Difference > 0
-2.1883
Difference: (Age before GBL)-(Age after GBL)

Prob
Level
0.031
0.016
0.984

Decision
(5%)
Reject Ho
Reject Ho
Accept Ho

Power
Power
(Alpha=.05) (Alpha=.01)
0.581
0.335
0.701
0.432
0.000
0.000

Median Statistics
Variable
Age before GBL
Age after GBL

Count
57
36

95% LCL
of Mean
47
49

Median
49
50.5

95% UCL
of Mean
51
53

Plots Section
Histogram of Age_after_GBL
15.0

18.8

11.3

Count

Count

Histogram of Age_before_GBL
25.0

12.5

6.3

0.0
20.0

7.5

3.8

30.0

40.0

Age_before_GBL

50.0

60.0

0.0
30.0

40.0

50.0

Age_after_GBL

60.0

70.0
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APPENDIX B
Two-Sample Test Report for CEO’s Adjusted Tenure Pre and Post GBL (1999)
Standard Standard 95% LCL
Tenure after GBL
58 5.569
2.933
0.385
Tenure before GBL
119 14.958
10.126
0.928
Note: T-alpha (Tenure after GBL) = 2.0025, T-alpha (Tenure before GBL) = 1.9803
Confidence-Limits of Difference Section

95% UCL Variable
4.798
6.340
13.120
16.796

Variance
Mean Standard
Assumption
DF Difference Deviation
Equal
175 -9.389
8.482
Unequal
152.74 -9.389
10.542
1.005
Note: T-alpha (Equal) = 1.9736, T-alpha (Unequal) = 1.9756

95% LCL
of Mean
-12.070
-7.404

Standard
Error
1.358
-11.374

95% UCL
of Mean
-6.708

Equal-Variance T-Test Section
Alternative
Hypothesis
T-Value
Difference <> 0
-6.913
Difference: (Tenure_afterGBL)-(Tenure_beforeGBL)

Histogram of Tenure_beforeGBL
50.0

Count

37.5

25.0

12.5

0.0
0.0

12.5

25.0

Tenure_beforeGBL

37.5

50.0

Prob
Decision
Level
(5%)
0.000 Reject Ho

Power
Power
(Alpha=.05) (Alpha=.01)
1.000
0.999990
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APPENDIX C
Output of Multiple Regression for Research Hypothesis Two
Specific Hypothesis (1)
Pearson Correlations Section

Age
Prior Exp
School tier
Change in Revenue
Degree
Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.000004
Run Summary Section
Parameter
Dependent Variable
Number Ind. Variables
Weight Variable
R2

Adj R2
Coefficient of Variation
Mean Square Error

Age
Prior Exp
School Tier Change in Revenue
1.000
-0.040
-0.172
-0.002
-0.040
1.000
-0.142
0.076
-0.172
-0.142
1.000
-0.026
-0.002
0.076
-0.026
1.000
0.157
0.033
-0.122
-0.030
Standardized Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.150887
Value
Change in Revenue
6
None
0.011

Parameter
Rows Processed
Rows Filtered Out
Rows with X's Missing
Rows with Weight Missing

Value
307
0
141
0

0.000
2.070
2.865949E+08

Rows with Y Missing
Rows Used in Estimation
Sum of Weights

12
154
154

Square Root of MSE
Ave Abs Pct Error
Descriptive Statistics Section
Variable
Age
(Degree=0)

Degree
0.157
0.033
-0.122
-0.030
1.000

16929.12
3016.032

Completion Status Normal Completion

Count
154

Mean
49.130

Standard
Deviation
7.494

154

0.623

0.486

0

1

154

1.948052E-02

0.139

0

1

154

2.597403E-02

0.160

0

1

154

0.227

0.420

0

1

154

0.299

0.459

0

1

154

8180.361

16686.65

-5100

96206

Minimum
23

Maximum
66

(Prior Exp=-1)
(Prior Exp=0)
(School tier=-1)
(School tier=0)
Change in Revenue
Estimated Model
6697.868 + 8.773*Age + 1293.647*(Degree=0) -5330.492*(Prior Exp=-1)-7912.504*(Prior Exp=0) + 294.075*(School tier=-1) +
1632.307*(School tier=0)
Regression Equation Section
Independent
Variable
Intercept
Age
(Degree=0)

Regression
Coefficient
b(i)
6697.868
8.773

Standard
Error
Sb(i)
9642.558
187.704

T-Value
to test
H0:B(i)=0
0.695
0.047

Prob
Level
0.488
0.963

Reject
H0 at
5%?
No
No

1293.647

2866.792

0.451

0.653

No

-5330.492

9919.694

-0.537

0.592

No

-7912.504

8725.904

-0.907

0.366

No

294.075

3592.166

0.082

0.935

No

1632.307

3251.765

0.502

0.616

No

(Prior Exp=-1)
(Prior Exp =0)
(School tier=-1)
(School tier=0)
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Analysis of Variance Section
Source
Intercept
Model
Error
Total(Adjusted)

DF
1
6
147
153

Analysis of Variance
Model
Term
Intercept
Model
Age
Degree
Prior Exp

R2
0.011
0.989
1.000

Sum of
Squares

Sum of
Squares
1.030542E+10
4.725222E+08
4.212946E+10
4.260198E+10

Mean
Square
1.030542E+10
7.87537E+07
2.865949E+08
2.784443E+08

F-Ratio
1.030542E+10
7.87537E+07
626065.1
5.835898E+07

F-Ratio

Prob
Level

0.275

0.948

Prob
Level

Power
(5%)

0.275
0.002
0.204

0.948
0.963
0.653

DF
1
6
1
1

0.011
0.000
0.001

Mean
Square
1.030542E+10
4.725222E+08
626065.1
5.835898E+07

2

0.007

3.088295E+08

1.544148E+08

0.539

0.585

2
147
153

0.002
0.989
1.000

7.62998E+07
4.212946E+10
4.260198E+10

3.81499E+07
2.865949E+08
2.784443E+08

0.133

0.876

R2

School tier
Error
Total(Adjusted)

PRESS Section
From
PRESS
Residuals
4.520033E+10
1602749
0.0000

Parameter
Sum of Squared Residuals
Sum of |Residuals|
R2
Normality Tests Section
Test
Name
Shapiro Wilk
Anderson Darling
D'Agostino Skewness
D'Agostino Kurtosis
D'Agostino Omnibus

Test
Value
0.5761
22.9095
9.1851
6.3418
124.5836

Prob
Level
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000

Histogram of Residuals of Change_in_Revenue
120.0

Count

90.0

60.0

30.0

0.0
-20000.0

10000.0

40000.0

70000.0

Residuals of Change_in_Revenue

From
Regular
Residuals
4.212946E+10
1543773
0.0111

100000.0

Reject H0
At Alpha = 20%?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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APPENDIX D
Output of Multiple Regression for Research Hypothesis Two
Specific Hypothesis (2)
Pearson Correlations Section (Row-Wise Deletion)
Age
Prior Exp
School Tier
Change in Stock Price
Degree
Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.000267

Age
Prior Exp School Tier Change in S Degree
1.000
-0.041
-0.174
-0.100
-0.041
1.000
-0.141
0.017
-0.174
-0.141
1.000
-0.125
-0.100
0.017
-0.125
1.000
-0.063
0.159
0.031
-0.127
-0.063
Standardized Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.363045

Parameter

Value
Value
Change in Stock Price
6
None
0.041
0.002
11.9402
6.669676E+07
155.000
8166.809
Normal Completion
62054.263

Dependent Variable
Number Ind. Variables
Weight Variable
R2
Adj R2
Coefficient of Variation
Mean Square Error
Square Root of MSE
Ave Abs Pct Error
Variable
Age
(Degree=0)

0.159
0.031
-0.127
1.000

Parameter
Rows Processed
Rows Filtered Out
Rows with X's Missing
Rows with Weight Missing
Rows with Y Missing
Rows Used in Estimation
Sum of Weights

307
0
141
0
11
155

Completion Status

Count
155

Mean
49.110

Standard
Deviation
7.474

155

0.626

0.485

0

1

155

1.935484E-02

0.138

0

1

155

2.580645E-02

0.159

0

1

155

0.226

0.419

0

155

0.297

0.458

0

1

155

683.979

8174.287

-20.85

101790

Minimum Maximum
23
66

(Prior Exp=-1)
(Prior Exp =0)
(School tier=-1)

(School tier =0)
Change in Stock Price

Independent
Variable
Intercept
Age
(Degree=0)

Regression

Standard

T-Value

Reject

Power

Coefficient
b(i)
5344.154
-126.373

Error
Sb(i)
4650.190
90.545

to test
H0:B(i)=0
1.149
-1.396

Prob
Level
0.252
0.165

H0 at
5%?
No
No

of Test
at 5%
0.208
0.284

1042.520

1381.172

0.755

0.452

No

0.117

315.649

4784.728

0.066

0.948

No

0.051

200.824

4207.705

0.048

0.962

No

0.050

3461.820

1729.618

2.001

0.047

Yes

0.511

338.820

1564.877

0.217

0.829

No

0.055

(Prior Exp=-1)
(Prior Exp =0)
(School tier=-1)
(School tier =0)
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APPENDIX E
Output of Multiple Regression for Research Hypothesis Two
Specific Hypothesis (3)

Pearson Correlations Section
Age
Prior Exp
School Tier Change in ROE Degree
Age
1.000
-0.039
-0.174
0.171
0.147
Prior Exp
-0.039
1.000
-0.147
-0.134
School tier
-0.174
-0.147
1.000
-0.013
-0.119
Change in ROE
0.171
-0.134
-0.013
1.000
0.049
Degree
0.147
0.030
-0.119
0.049
1.000
Cronbachs Alpha = 0.091152
Standardized Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.126015
Parameter
Value
Parameter
Dependent Variable
Change in ROE Rows Processed
307
Number Ind. Variables
6
Rows Filtered Out
Weight Variable
None
Rows with X's Missing
141
R2
0.204
Rows with Weight Missing
0
Adj R2
0.170
Rows with Y Missing
17
Coefficient of Variation
8.3790
Rows Used in Estimation
149
Mean Square Error
700.642
Sum of Weights
149.000
Square Root of MSE
26.470
Completion Status
Normal Completion
Ave Abs Pct Error 359.644
Standard
Variable
Count
Mean
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Age
149
49.215
7.430
23
66
(Degree =0)
149
0.631
0.484
0
1
(Prior Exp =-1)
149 2.013423E-02
0.141
0
1
(Prior Exp =0)
149 2.684564E-02
0.162
0
1
(School tier =-1)
149
0.235
0.425
0
1
(School tier =0)
149
0.295
0.458
0
1
Change in ROE
149
3.159
29.052
-52
297.9

Independent
Variable
Intercept
App
(Degree =0)

0.030

Value
0

Regression
Coefficient
b(i)
-28.374
0.594

Standard
Error
Sb(i)
15.425
0.301

T-Value
to test
H0:B(i)=0
-1.839
1.975

Prob
Level
0.068
0.050

Reject
H0 at
5%?
No
No

Power
of Test
at 5%
0.447
0.501

-2.286

4.566

-0.501

0.618

No

0.079

-14.976

15.519

-0.965

0.336

No

0.160

73.995

13.661

5.416

0.000

Yes

0.100

2.044

5.664

0.361

0.719

No

0.065

5.359

5.197

1.031

0.304

No

0.176

(Prior Exp =-1)
(Prior Exp =0)
(School tier =-1)
(School tier =0)
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APPENDIX F
Output of Multiple Regression for Research Hypothesis Three
Specific Hypothesis (1)

Pearson Correlations Section
Tenure
Tenure
Origin
Change in Revenue
Ranking of Firm
Cronbachs Alpha = 0.000423
Run Summary Section
Parameter
Dependent Variable
Number Ind. Variables
Weight Variable
R2
Adj R2
Coefficient of Variation
Mean Square Error
Square Root of MSE
Completion
Ave Abs Pct Error

Origin
Change in Revenue Ranking of Firm
1.000
0.145
0.219
-0.079
0.145
1.000
0.072
0.146
0.219
0.072
1.000
0.360
-0.079
0.146
0.360
1.000
Standardized Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.402325

Value
Change in Revenue
4
None
0.224
0.190
1.922
1.600888E+08
12652.62

Parameter
Rows Processed
Rows Filtered Out
Rows with X's Missing
Rows with Weight Missing
Rows with Y Missing
Rows Used in Estimation
Sum of Weights
Completion Status

Value
307
0
213
0
0
94
94.000
Normal

773.246

Descriptive Statistics Section
Variable
(Outsider =0)
(Ranking of Firm=-1)

Count
94

Mean
0.128

Standard
Deviation
0.335

Minimum
0

Maximum
1

94

0.234

0.426

0

1

94
94

0.309
9.798

0.464
8.728

0
1

1
45

94

6582.394

14054

-3554

96206

(Ranking of Firm=0)
Tenure
Change in Revenue

Regression Equation Section
Regression
Standard
T-Value
Reject
Independent
Coefficient
Error
to test
Prob
H0 at
Variable
b(i)
Sb(i)
H0:B(i)=0
Level
5%?
Intercept
8912.119
2429.293
3.669
0.0004
Yes
(Outsider =0)
-782.007
4093.475
-0.191
0.8489
No
(Ranking of Firm=-1)
-11980.405
3389.051
-3.535
0.0006
Yes
(Ranking of Firm=0)
-11697.168
3077.973
-3.800
0.0003
Yes
Tenure
426.902
153.096
2.788
0.0065
Yes
Estimated Model
8912.119 -782.007*(Outsider =0)-11980.404*(Ranking of Firm=-1)-11697.168*(Ranking of Firm=0)+
426.902*Tenure

Power
of Test
at 5%
0.952
0.054
0.938
0.964
0.788
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APPENDIX G
Output of Multiple Regression for Research Hypothesis Three
Specific Hypothesis (2)

Pearson Correlations Section

(Row-Wise Deletion)

Origin
Change in Stock Price
Ranking of Firm
Adjusted tenure
Cronbachs Alpha = 0.000753

Origin

CiS
Ranking of Firm Adjusted tenure
1.000
0.038
0.266
0.038
1.000
0.137
0.367
0.266
0.137
1.000
0.111
0.367
-0.083
Standardized Cronbachs Alpha = 0.392506

Run Summary Section
Parameter
Dependent Variable
Number Ind. Variables
Weight Variable
R2
Adj R2
Coefficient of Variation
Mean Square Error
Square Root of MSE
Ave Abs Pct Error

Value
Parameter
Change in Stock Price
4
Rows Filtered Out
None
Rows with X's Missing
0.185
Rows with Weight Missing
0.128
Rows with Y Missing
7.1821 Rows Used in Estimation
1.456433E+08
12068.28 Completion Status
49889.506

0.111
-0.083
1.000

Value
Rows Processed
0
245
0
0
62
Sum of Weights
Normal Completion

307

62.000

Descriptive Statistics Section
Variable
Adjusted tenure
(Outsider =0)
(Ranking of Firm=-1)
62
(Ranking of Firm=0)
62
Change in Stock Price
62

Standard
Count
Mean Deviation
6211.75806
9.613319
628.064516E-02 0.2745122

Minimum
1
0

Maximum
45
1

0.2741936

0.4497488

0

1

0.3225806

0.4712799

0

1

1680.338

12922.52

-0.47

101790

Regression Equation Section
Independent
Variable
Intercept
Adjusted tenure
(Outsider =0)
(Ranking of Firm=-1)
-5047.8710
(Ranking of Firm=0)
-6561.0666

Regression Standard
Coefficient Errorto test
b(i)
Sb(i)H0:B(i)=0
-1392.42642935.6116-0.474
552.6524164.98413.350
932.58796048.51330.154

T-Value
Prob
Level
0.6371
0.0014
0.8780

Reject
H0 at
5%?
No
Yes
No

3987.8632-1.2660.2107

No

0.2378

3701.2865-1.7730.0816

No

0.4141

Power
of Test
at 5%
0.0753
0.9087
0.0526

Estimated Model
-1392.426+ 552.652*Adjusted tenure+ 932.588*(Outsider =0)-5047.871*(Ranking of Firm=-1)-6561.067*(Ranking
of Firm=0)
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APPENDIX H
Output of Multiple Regression for Research Hypothesis Three
Specific Hypothesis (3)

Pearson Correlations Section
Origin
Change in ROE
Ranking of Firm
Adjusted tenure
Cronbachs Alpha =- 0.065700

(Row-Wise Deletion)
Origin
CiROE
Ranking of Firm Adjusted tenure
1.000
-0.317
0.277
0.106
-0.317
1.000
0.094
-0.045
0.277
0.094
1.000
-0.060
0.106
-0.045
-0.060
1.000
Standardized Cronbachs Alpha = 0.035346

Run Summary Section
Parameter

Value
Value
Change in ROE
4
None
0.173
0.114
10.9946
107.7824
61.000
10.38183
Normal Completion
204.459

Dependent Variable
Number Ind. Variables
Weight Variable
R2
Adj R2
Coefficient of Variation
Mean Square Error
Square Root of MSE
Ave Abs Pct Error
Descriptive Statistics Section
Variable
Adjusted tenure
(Outsider =0)
(Ranking of Firm=-1)

Parameter
Rows Processed
Rows Filtered Out
Rows with X's Missing
Rows with Weight Missing
Rows with Y Missing
Rows Used in Estimation
Sum of Weights

307
0
245
0
1
61

Completion Status

Count
61
61

Mean
11.59016
8.196721E-02

Standard
Deviation
9.601002
0.2765913

Minimum Maximum
1
45
0
1

61

0.2622951

0.4435328

0

61
61

0.3278688
0.9442623

0.4733326
11.02966

0
-31.8

1

(Ranking of Firm=0)
Change in ROE

Regression Equation Section
Regression
Independent
Coefficient
Variable
b(i)
Intercept
1.1166
Adjusted tenure
-0.0329
(Outsider =0)
16.8127
(Ranking of Firm=-1)
-6.3743
(Ranking of Firm=0)
1.5339

1
32.4

Standard
Error
Sb(i)
2.5314
0.1433
5.2340

T-Value
to test
H0:B(i)=0
0.441
-0.230
3.212

Prob
Level
0.6608
0.8192
0.0022

Reject
H0 at
5%?
No
No
Yes

Power
of Test
at 5%
0.0718
0.0559
0.8843

3.5057

-1.818

0.0744

No

0.4315

3.1861

0.481

0.6321

No

0.0760

Estimated Model
1.117 -3.291E-02*Adjusted tenure+ 16.813*(Outsider =0)-6.374*(Ranking of Firm=-1)+ 1.534*(Ranking of Firm=0)
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APPENDIX I
Analysis of Variance Report for Age
Expected Mean Squares Section
Source
Term
Denominator
Term DF
Fixed? Term
A ( ... ) 2
Yes
S(A)
S(A)
250
No
Note: Expected Mean Squares are for the balanced cell-frequency case.
Analysis of Variance Table
Source
Term DF
A ( ... ) 2
S(A)
250
Total (Adjusted)
Total 253
* Term significant at alpha = 0.05

Sum of Mean
Squares Square
1003.697 501.8483
16373.89 65.49557
252
17377.59

Expected
Mean Square
S+sA
S(A)

F-Ratio
7.66

Prob
Level
0.001

Power
(Alpha=0.05)
0.945992

Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks
Hypotheses
Ho: All medians are equal.
Ha: At least two medians are different.
Test Results
Method DF
Not Corrected for Ties
Ho
Corrected for Ties
Ho
Number Sets of Ties
Multiplicity Factor

Chi-Square
(H)
2

Prob
Level
14.44103

Decision(0.05)
0.000731

Reject

2

14.46785

0.000722

Reject

Z-Value
-3.7971
1.3847
136.44

Median
45
50
1.6997

51

30
30024

Group Detail
Group Count
IT Age 50
Ins Age 100
OFC Age

Sum of Mean
Ranks Rank
4590.00 91.80
13488.00 134.88
103
14053.00

Means and Effects Section
Term Count
All
253
A:
IT Age 50
Ins Age 100
OFC Age

Mean
48.58
44.58
49.39
103
1.835243

Duncan's Multiple-Comparison Test
Response: IT Age, Ins Age, OFC Age
Term A:
Alpha=0.050 Error Term=S(A) DF=250 MSE=65.49557

Standard
Error

1.144514
0.8092933
49.74

Effect
47.90262
-3.322621
1.487379
0.7974204

89

Different From
Group Count
IT Age 50
Ins Age 100
OFC Age

Mean
44.58
49.39
103

Groups
Ins Age, OFC Age
IT Age
49.74
IT Age

Notes:
This report provides multiple comparison tests for all pairwise differences between
the means. According to Hsu(1996, page 130), the specified family-wise error rate (alpha)
is overstated and the Tukey-Kramer method is recommended instead.
Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test
Variable IT Age
Ins Age
OFC Age
IT Age 0.0000
3.4020
3.5422
Ins Age 3.4020
0.0000
0.1517
OFC Age
3.5422
0.1517
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600
Bonferroni Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 2.3940

0.0000

Box Plot Section
Box Plot
70.00

Amount

55.00

40.00

25.00

10.00
IT_Age

Ins_Age

OFC_Age

Variables

Plots of Means Section
Means of Mean Value
50.00

Mean Value

48.50

47.00

45.50

44.00
IT_Age

Ins_Age

Variables

OFC_Age
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APPENDIX J
Analysis of Variance Report for Level of Education
Expected Mean Squares Section
Source
Term
Denominator
Term
DF
Fixed?
Term
A ( ... )
2
Yes
S(A)
S(A)
228
No
Note: Expected Mean Squares are for the balanced cell-frequency case.
Analysis of Variance Table
Source
Sum of
Mean
Power
Term
DF
Squares
Square
F-Ratio
(Alpha=0.05)
A ( ... )
2
0.8193162
0.4096581
1.73
0.361562
S(A)
228
53.89064
0.2363625
Total (Adjusted)
230
54.70996
Total
231
* Term significant at alpha = 0.05

Expected
Mean Square
S+sA
S(A)

Prob
Level
0.179

Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks
Hypotheses
Ho: All medians are equal.
Ha: At least two medians are different.
Test Results
Method

DF
Decision(0.05)
2

Not Corrected for Ties
Ho
Corrected for Ties
Ho

2

Number Sets of Ties
Multiplicity Factor

Chi-Square
(H)

Prob
Level

2.447354

0.294147

Accept

3.444396

0.178673

Accept

Mean
Rank
118.51
108.83
126.74

Z-Value
0.4389
-1.4115
1.2179

Median
0
0
0

2
3568026

Group Detail
Group
IT Edu Level
Ins Edu Level
OFC Edu Level

Count
86
99
46

Sum of
Ranks
10191.50
10774.50
5830.00

Means and Effects Section
Term
All
A:
IT Edu Level
Ins Edu Level
7.959099E-02
OFC Edu Level

Duncan's Multiple-Comparison Test

Count
Effect
231
0.4028233

Mean

Standard
Error

0.39

86
0.41
4.153432E-03
99
0.32

5.242519E-02

46
7.5437

7.168204E-02

0.48

4.886205E-02

-
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Response: IT Edu Level, Ins Edu Level, OFC Edu Level
Term A:
Alpha=0.050 Error Term=S(A) DF=228 MSE=0.2363625

Different From
Group
IT Edu Level
Ins Edu Level
OFC Edu Level

Count
99
86
46

Mean
0.41
0.32
0.48

Groups

Group
IT Edu Level
Ins Edu Level
OFC Edu Level

Comparison
Coefficient
-3
1
1

Count
86
99
46

Mean
0.4069767
0.3232323
0.4782609

Box Plot Section
Box Plot
1.00

Amount

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00
Edu_Leve

Edu_Leve

Edu_Leve

Variables

Plots of Means Section
Means of Mean Value
0.50

Mean Value

0.45

0.40

0.35

0.30
Edu_Leve

Edu_Leve

Variables

Edu_Leve
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APPENDIX K
Analysis of Variance Report for Tenure
Expected Mean Squares Section
Source
Term
Term
DF
Fixed?
A ( ... )
2
Yes
S(A)
249
No
Note: Expected Mean Squares are for the balanced cell-frequency case.

Denominator
Term
S(A)

Expected
Mean Square
S+sA
S(A)

Analysis of Variance Table
Source
Term
A ( ... )
S(A)
Total (Adjusted)
Total
* Term significant at alpha = 0.05

Sum of
Power
DF
Squares
(Alpha=0.05)
2
246.1834
0.316498
249
20548.5
251
20794.68
252

Mean
Square
123.0917

Prob
F-Ratio

Level

1.49

0.227

82.52408

Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks
Hypotheses
Ho: All medians are equal.
Ha: At least two medians are different.
Test Results
Method

DF
Decision(0.05)
2

Not Corrected for Ties
Ho
Corrected for Ties
Ho

2

Number Sets of Ties
Multiplicity Factor

Chi-Square
(H)

Prob
Level

1.72557

0.421985

Accept

1.732566

0.420512

Accept

Mean
Rank
133.12
119.68
127.43

Z-Value
1.1600
-1.2341
0.1008

Median
8
7
8.5

26
64620

Group Detail
Group
IT Tenure
Ins Tenure
OFC Tenure

Count
99
103
50

Sum of
Ranks
13179.00
12327.50
6371.50

Means and Effects Section
Term
All
A:
IT Tenure
Ins Tenure
1.078201

Standard
Error

Count
Effect
252
10.97141

Mean

99
1.129605
103

12.10101

0.9130041

9.893204

0.8951004

10.96429

-
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OFC Tenure

50
10.92
5.140466E-02

1.284711

Duncan's Multiple-Comparison Test
Term A:
Alpha=0.050 Error Term=S(A) DF=249 MSE=82.52408

Different From
Group
IT Tenure
Ins Tenure
OFC Tenure

Count
103
50
99

Mean
9.89
10.92
12.10

Groups

Plots of Means Section
Means of Mean Value
12.50

Mean Value

11.75

11.00

10.25

9.50
Tenurexx

Tenurexx

Tenurexx

Variables

Box Plot Section
Box Plot
50.00

Amount

37.50

25.00

12.50

0.00
Tenurexx

Tenurexx

Tenurexx

Variables

Notes:
This report provides multiple comparison tests for all pairwise differences between
the means. According to Hsu(1996, page 130), the specified family-wise error rate (alpha)
is overstated and the Tukey-Kramer method is recommended instead.
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APPENDIX L
Output of Multiple Regression for Outperformed CEOs
The following is the multiple regression for outperformed CEOs in order to
determine their general demographic characteristics. Here outperformed means that the
percentage of change in revenue is greater than the percentage of change in the S & P 500
index during the same period.
Yt (Change in revenue) = β0 + β1 (Incoming CEO’s age) + β2 (School Tier) +
β3(Degree) + β4 (Prior Experiences) + β5 (Firm Size) + β6 (Insider/Outsider)
+ β7 (Tenure) + Є
From the result, we can now conclude that the average age of the outperformed
CEO is approximately 49 years old, and he/she is an insider with previous COO title and
graduated from school tier 1 and 2 with preferably a master degree. This result applies to
firm size above 700th rank. The ideal tenure for CEO is between 10 and 12 years.
One interesting finding is that more CEOs have only undergraduate degrees than any
other degrees.

95

Summary Section of Age
Count
146

Mean
48.81

Counts Section of Age
Sum of
Adjusted
Rows
Frequencies
Sum Squares
303
146

Standard
Deviation
7.989921

Standard
Error
0.6612505

Missing

Distinct

Values

Values

Sum

Sum Squares

157

33

7126

357064

Median
50

Geometric
Mean
48.0558

Harmonic
Mean
47.15127

146

146

Minimum
20

Maximum Range
66
46

Total

9256.63

Means Section of Age
Parameter
Value
Std Error
95% LCL
95% UCL
T-Value
Prob Level
Count

Mean
48.80822
0.6612505
47.50129
50.11515
73.8120
0.000000
146

48
51

Sum
Mode
7126
51
96.54258
6935.188
7316.813

12

Variation Section of Age
Parameter

Variance

Standard
Deviation

Unbiased
Std Dev

Std Error
of Mean

Interquartile
Range Range

Value
Std Error
95% LCL
95% UCL

63.83883
9.220871
51.36035
81.5162

7.989921
0.8160458
7.166613
9.028632

8.003708

0.6612505
6.753643E-02
0.5931131
0.7472149

10

|X-Median|
6.136986

(X-Mean)^2
63.40158
9.157715

(X-Mean)^3
-393.4879
170.1796

(X-Mean)^4
16263.87
5543.633

25th
Percentile
44
42
45

50th
Percentile
50
48
51

75th
Percentile
54
53
56

90th
Percentile
58
56
60

Mean-Deviation Section of Age
Parameter
|X-Mean|
Average
6.24545
Std Error
0.3984393

Quartile Section of Age
10th
Parameter
Percentile
Value
39
95% LCL
34
95% UCL
41

46
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Plots Section of Age
Histogram of Agex
50.0

Count

37.5

25.0

12.5

0.0
20.0

32.5

45.0

57.5

70.0

Agex

Summary Section of I/O
Standard
Deviation
0.2864373

Standard
Error
2.706578E-02

Missing

Distinct

Values

Values

Sum

Sum Squares

191

2

102

102

Summary Section of Prior Experience
Standard
Count
Mean
Deviation
104
0.9423077
0.3061481

Standard
Error
3.002029E-02

Minimum
-1

Maximum Range
1
2

Counts Section of Prior Experience
Sum of
Missing
Rows
Frequencies
Values
303
104
199

Distinct
Values
3

Sum
98

Total
Adjusted
Sum Squares
102
9

Count
112

Mean
0.9107143

Counts Section of I/O
Sum of
Adjusted
Rows
Frequencies
Sum Squares
303
112

Minimum
0

Maximum Range
1
1

Total

Plots Section of I_O
Histogram of I_O
150.0

Count

112.5

75.0

37.5

0.0
0.0

0.3

0.5

0.8

1.0

I_O

Percentile Section of I_O
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Summary Section of School Tier
Count
105

Mean
0.1809524

Counts Section of School Tier
Sum of
Rows
Frequencies
303
105

Standard
Deviation
0.8178414

Standard
ErrorMinimum
7.981315E-02

Maximum
-1
1

Range
2

Missing
Values
198

Distinct
Values
3
19

Total
Sum Sum Squares
73 69.5619

Adjusted
Sum Squares

Quartile Section of School Tier
10th
Parameter
Percentile
Value
-1
95% LCL
-1
95% UCL
-1

25th
Percentile
-1
-1
0

50th
Percentile
0
0
1

75th
Percentile
1
1
1

90th
Percentile
1
1
1

Plots Section of School Tier
Histogram of School_Tierxxxx
60.0

Count

45.0

30.0

15.0

0.0
-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

School_Tierxxxx

Summary Section of Education Level
Count
65

Mean
0.6769231

Counts Section of Education Level
Sum of
Rows
Frequencies
303
65

Standard
Deviation
0.4712912

Standard
Error
5.845648E-02

Minimum
0

Missing
Values
238

Distinct
Values
2

Total
Adjusted
Sum Sum Squares Sum Squares
44 44
14.21538

Maximum
1

Range
1
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Plots Section of Education Level
Histogram of Education_Levelxxxx
80.0

Count

60.0

40.0

20.0

0.0
0.0

0.3

0.5

0.8

1.0

Education_Levelxxxx

Summary Section of Firm Size
Count
60

Mean
0.1833333

Counts Section of Firm Size
Sum of
Rows
Frequencies
303
60

Standard
Deviation
0.8334463

Standard
Error
0.1075975

Minimum
-1

Maximum
1

Missing
Values
243

Distinct
Values
3
11

Sum
43

Total
Adjusted
Sum Squares Sum Squares
40.98333

Plots Section of Firm Size
Histogram of Firm_Size
40.0

Count

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0
-1.0

-0.5

0.0

Firm_Size

0.5

1.0

Range
2
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Summary Section of Tenure
Count
111

Standard
Deviation
9.999042

Standard
Error
0.9490671

Minimum
1

Maximum
45

Missing
Values
192

Distinct
Values
32

Total
Sum Sum Squares
1302 26270

Adjusted
Sum Squares
10997.89

Mean
11.72973
0.9490671
9.848902
13.61056
12.3592
0.000000
111

Median
8

Geometric
Mean
8.598675

Harmonic
Mean
6.26896

111

111

10th
Percentile
3
2
4

25th
Percentile
5
4
6

Mean
11.73

Counts Section of Tenure
Sum of
Rows
Frequencies
303
111

Range
44

Means Section of Tenure
Parameter
Value
Std Error
95% LCL
95% UCL
T-Value
Prob Level
Count

7
9

Sum
1302
105.3464
1093.228
1510.772

Mode
9

11

Section of Tenure
Parameter
Value
95% LCL
95% UCL

Plots Section of Tenure
Histogram of Tenurex
60.0

Count

45.0

30.0

15.0

0.0
0.0

12.5

25.0

Tenurex

37.5

50.0

50th
Percentile
8
7
9

75th
Percentile
15
10
22

90th
Percentile
27.4
22
36
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Multiple Regression Report
Run Summary Section
Parameter
Dependent Variable
Number Ind. Variables
Weight Variable
R2
Adj R2
Coefficient of Variation
Mean Square Error
Square Root of MSE
Completion
Ave Abs Pct Error

Value
Change in Revenue(C6160)
9
None
0.444
0.251
1.4811
2.466152E+08
15703.99

Parameter
Rows Processed
Rows Filtered Out
Rows with X's Missing
Rows with Weight Missing
Rows with Y Missing
Rows Used in Estimation
Sum of Weights
Completion Status

Value
303
0
266
0
1
36
36.000
Normal

305.148

Descriptive Statistics Section
Variable
Age
(Education Level=0)
(Firm Size=-1)
(Firm Size=0)
(I_O=0)
(Prior Exp=-1)

Count
36

Mean
47.61

Standard
Deviation
7.979537

Minimum
23

Maximum
60

36
36
36
36

0.25
0.25
0.1944444
0.1388889

0.439155
0.439155
0.4013865
0.3507362

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

36

2.777778E-02

0.1666667

0

1

36

0.2777778

0.4542568

0

1

36
36
36

0.1944444
11.77778
10603.21

0.4013865
10.4036
18143.86

0
2
155

1
42
96206

(School Tier=-1)
(School Tier=0)
Tenure
C6160

Regression Equation Section
Regression
Independent
Coefficient
Variable
b(i)
Intercept
-28569.3041
Age
586.1209
(Education Level=0)
10865.2235
(Firm Size=-1)
-10754.3086
(Firm Size=0)
-11818.3370
(I_O=0)
-4071.7898
(Prior Exp=-1)
-1793.6966
(School Tier=-1)
7860.6687
(School Tier=0)
2635.3303
Tenure
972.7071

Standard
Error
Sb(i)
36588.7512
656.5067

T-Value
to test
H0:B(i)=0
-0.781
0.893

Prob
Level
0.4420
0.3802

Reject
H0 at
5%?
No
No

Power
of Test
at 5%
0.1169
0.1381

7446.9538
11134.1122
8748.7420
11226.4033

1.459
-0.966
-1.351
-0.363

0.1565
0.3430
0.1884
0.7198

No
No
No
No

0.2900
0.1536
0.2556
0.0641

19754.8905

-0.091

0.9283

No

0.0509

6296.6154

1.248

0.2230

No

0.2252

8997.9331
477.8034

0.293
2.036

0.7719
0.0521

No
No

0.0592
0.5002

Estimated Model
-28569.30+ 586.12*Age+ 10865.22*(Education Level=0)-10754.31*(Firm Size=-1)-11818.34*(Firm Size=0)4071.79*(I_O=0)-1793.70
*(Prior_Exp=-1)+ 7860.67*(School_Tier=-1)+ 2635.33*(School_Tier=0)+ 972.71*Tenure
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Regression Coefficient Section
Independent
Regression
Standard
Lower
Variable
Coefficient
Error
95% C.L.
Intercept
-28569.3041 36588.7512
-103778.5593
Age
586.1209
656.5067
-763.3478
(Education Level=0)
10865.2235
7446.9538
-4442.2093
(Firm Size=-1)
-10754.3086 11134.1122
-33640.8041
(Firm Size=0)
-11818.3370
8748.7420
-29801.6337
(I_O=0)
-4071.7898 11226.4033
-27147.9924
(Prior Exp=-1)
-1793.6966 19754.8905
-42400.4557
(School Tier=-1)
7860.6687
6296.6154
-5082.2096
0.1968
(School Tier=0)
2635.3303
8997.9331
-15860.1860
0.0583
Tenure
972.7071
477.8034
-9.4318
0.5577
Note: The T-Value used to calculate these confidence limits was 2.056.
Analysis of Variance Section
Sum of
Mean
Source
DF
R2
Squares
Square
Intercept
1
4.047407E+09
4.047407E+09
Model
9
0.4435
5.109996E+09
5.677773E+08
Error
26
0.5565
6.411994E+09
2.466152E+08
Total(Adjusted)
35
1.0000
1.152199E+10
3.291997E+08
Analysis of Variance Detail Section
Model
Term
DF
Intercept
1
Model
9
Age
1
Education Level
1
Firm Size
2
I_O
1
Prior Exp
1
School Tier
2
Tenure
1
Error
26
Total(Adjusted)
35

0.4435
0.0171

Sum of
Squares
4.047407E+09
5.109996E+09
1.965694E+08

Mean
Square
4.047407E+09
5.677773E+08
1.965694E+08

0.0456
0.0415
0.0028
0.0002
0.0334
0.0887
0.5565
1.0000

5.249764E+08
4.780627E+08
3.244212E+07
2033146
3.850918E+08
1.022081E+09
6.411994E+09
1.152199E+10

5.249764E+08
2.390314E+08
3.244212E+07
2033146
1.925459E+08
1.022081E+09
2.466152E+08
3.291997E+08

R2

Plots Section
Histogram of Residuals of C6160
15.0

Count

11.3

7.5

3.8

0.0
-40000.0

-15000.0

10000.0

35000.0

Residuals of C6160

60000.0

Upper
95% C.L. Coefficient
46639.9511
0.0000
1935.5897
0.2578
26172.6563
12132.1868
6164.9597
19004.4127

0.2630
-0.2603
-0.2615
-0.0787

38813.0624

-0.0165

20803.5469

21130.8467
1954.8461

Prob
F-Ratio

Power
Level (5%)

2.3020.0468 0.7902

Prob
F-Ratio

Power
Level (5%)

2.3020.0468 0.7902
0.7970.3802 0.1381
2.1290.1565
0.9690.3927
0.1320.7198
0.0080.9283
0.7810.4685
4.1440.0521

0.2900
0.1998
0.0641
0.0509
0.1684
0.5002

